Emulation or Innovation? A Comparative Analysis of the Hizmet Movement and Muhammadiyah of Indonesia with Respect to Philanthropy and Social Welfare

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Despite the fact that Anatolia and the Indonesian archipelago lie at opposite ends of the Muslim world, and that there has been comparatively little direct exchange between the two cultural spheres, Anatolian Islam and Indonesian Islam are remarkably congruent. The contribution of Sufism to the development of Indonesian Islam is a key reason for this. It is not surprising then that the thought of leading progressive Islamic intellectuals in Indonesia, such as Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, share essential elements with the thought of Fethullah Gülen in Turkey. In civil society organizations inspired by both parties, there have been innovations in combining charity, relief, and development in such a way as to reconcile the giver's religious idea of who qualifies for charitable giving on an individual level with a broader, more holistic perspective on promoting community-level, longer-term development processes. Like other social and political forces, Islamic philanthropy is shaping and being shaped by several global trends, such as the migration of large numbers of Muslims to the West and the consequent rise of philanthropic actors such as Fethullah Gülen.

Accordingly, this paper will compare Islamic philanthropy emanating from the Hizmet movement with that in Indonesia—specifically the social movement of Muhammadiyah, which was formed in 1912. Muhammadiyah has been acclaimed for its achievements in establishing schools and hospitals to fill the gaps left by the secular state. In this sense, we may wonder if the movement in some way has inspired the Hizmet movement in Turkey, and therefore has been emulated by the latter. However, we may also wonder if Hizmet wants to avoid some of the deficiencies of Muhammadiyah, in which case it has to make innovations in order to be successful in a different cultural and ethical environment.

In the first section, we will discuss how and in what sense Muhammadiyah has been echoed by Hizmet. In the second section, an illumination of Gülen's thinking is pursued, especially regarding the concepts of recognition and distribution, which can help us understand the ideology behind the movement with respect to philanthropy and social welfare. If Gülen wants to motivate his followers to voluntarily contribute to the cause of the movement, then a resounding clarification of its basic thinking is important. In the third section, a comparison between Muhammadiyah and Hizmet is engaged, and the latter's transcendence beyond the former is pinpointed. The last section is a brief conclusion.

1. Hizmet Echoes Muhammadiyah?

As a journalist who lived in Istanbul for many years once said, "As I became more acquainted with Turkey, it began to seem as if everything there was somehow linked to Gülen. Not only NGOs, businesses, and schools, but also people".[1] If you ask Hizmet volunteers who they are,[2] they will call themselves a "faith-based, civic society movement" or a "volunteers movement" made up of people who admire the thoughts and writings of Fethullah Gülen. They are an organic network of people whose goal is to do good works at Gülen's noble behest while spreading his message of love and tolerance, as well as his vision of Islam. According to academics who have studied the movement, there are, more or less, three levels of involvement: sympathizers, who admire Gülen; friends, who support or work for the movement to some degree; and the *cemaat*, or community, who are the core adherents closest to Gülen himself.

The Hizmet movement reminds people of everything from Opus Dei to Scientology to the Masons, Mormons, and Moonies. Mark Jürgensmeyer, an expert on international religious movements, says that the participants of Hizmet echo those of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia, the Soka Gakkai (創価学会) of Japan, and various Indian guru-led or political religious groups.[3] Gülen also has been referred to as Turkish Islam's Billy Graham.[4]

Who or what is Muhammadiyah? Influenced by the writings of Middle Eastern reformists like Muhammad Abduh and Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, reformist Muslims in Indonesia were keen to formulate a systematic response to the challenge of the West. In Indonesia, several reformist organizations arose in the early twentieth century to take up this charge. The most influential of these was the "followers of Muhammad", or Muhammadiyah. Founded in 1912 in Central Java by a minor religious official in the Javanese court, Muhammadiyah focused its attention on education, health, and care for the poor rather than formal politics. In the last years of the colonial era, Muhammadiyah spread to most corners of the archipelago; today, it boasts some twenty-five million followers.[5] Muhammadiyah showed none

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[1] Suzy Hansen, "The Global Imam: What Does the Leader of the World's Most Influential Islamic Movement Really Want?" *The New Republic*, 2 December 2010, p. 10.

[2] The participants of Hizmet blanch at the terms "follower" and "member". In Turkish, the term is *Fethullahçi*, referring to Gülen's first name.

[3] Mark Jürgenmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).

[4] ABC Radio National, "Fethullah Gulen on ABC Radio National's Encounter," fgulen.com, 7 October 2007 (http://www.fethullahgulen.org/press-room/news/2412-fethullah-gulen-on-abc-radio-nationals-encounter.html).

[5] See, *e.g.*, Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1983).

of traditional Islam's reserve toward Western education, technology, and science; it was unabashedly modernist.[6] Organizationally, Muhammadiyah repudiated the traditionalists' emphasis on charismatic religious leadership, and it developed organizations with rule-governed bureaucracies and open elections.[7]

If we trace back to the time when the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 and when the nationalists in Indonesia declared their republic in 1945, we will also find something similar between the two countries. From its foundation, the Turkish Republic has enjoyed a curiously ambivalent relationship with Islam and with its Ottoman heritage.[8] On one hand, confidence about modernization and Turkey's manifest destiny rests directly upon the successes of the Ottoman Empire as the last great Islamic fortress. And, as dramatic as the Republic reforms were, they would not have been possible without the earlier reforms of the Ottoman period. On the other hand, the Ottoman reforms were judged inadequate when it came to overcoming religious conservatism.

The Republic's response to the inherent conservatism of Ottoman Islam was to adopt one of the most radical approaches to secularization seen anywhere in the world. The secularism that appeared in Turkey was, in theory, analogous to the laicism that has been achieved in France through the reforms of the Third Republic, while a secularism of quite different characters had been developed in Northern Europe, Britain, and New World nations such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. In practice, the secularism of the Turkish Republic was unique.

Ihsan Yilmaz argues that the republicans responded to the enduring cultural authority of Islam and to what they judged to be the failure of earlier reforms to constrain it, by seeking to achieve complete control of the production and dissemination of religious knowledge.[9] Yilmaz has dubbed it "Lausannian Islam". In signing the treaty of Lausanne, the new Turkish Republic declared that all

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[6] After the founding of Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) in 1926, however, the so-called traditionalists introduced extensive educational and organizational reforms. These had a limited impact, however, on the authority of traditionalist scholars. See, Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), Chap. 3, n. 20.

[7] Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 40.

[8] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); cited in Greg Barton, "Progressive Islamic Thought, Civil Society and the Gülen Movement in the National Context: Parallels with Indonesia", paper prepared for the conference on "Islam in the Contemporary World: The Fethullah Gülen Movement in Thought and Practice", Rice University, Houston, 12-13 November 2005, p. 6 (http://fethullahgulenconerencfe.org/houston/read.php?p=progressive-islamic-thought-civil-society-gulen-movement-indonesia).

[9] Ihsan Yilmaz, "State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey," *The Muslim World*, 95 (July 2005), pp. 385-411.

connections between Turkey, Islam, and the empire were completely finished. But the result was not merely a separation of "church and state".[10] In preventing the "church" from interfering with its own affairs, the state decided to take charge of the affairs of the church. Therefore, when the Republic was inaugurated, the Directorate of Religious Affairs replaced the Ottoman Ministry of Religion and became a key element in the state's management of national culture and the control of dissent.[11]

The nationalists in Indonesia also did something similar when they declared their republic in 1945.[12] They too decided that the best prospects for developing a modern nation were in a secular state structure, and they recognized that the state would nevertheless have to engage with religion through a ministry of religious affairs. As their counterpart in Turkey who had endured four years of world war, they also had to fight a war of independence against European imperialism to secure national sovereignty. It resulted in a state that privileged the military culturally, socially, and politically, while the nationalists struggled to defend the national interest. In both nations, a strong military was seen as essential to the survival and healthy development of the new republics.

The ideological thinking behind the statism of the Turkish Republic was paralleled two decades later in the Republic of Indonesia. Both states were guided by corporatist philosophies that privileged the authority of the state over the rights of individuals and empowered the military. There are important differences between the two nations, not least with respect to Islam and civil society.[13] But overall, the two are more similar to each other than they are to other large Muslim nations, despite being at opposite ends of the Muslim world and having very different histories.

2. Recognition vs. Redistribution

"Is anybody out there?"—an outcry rising from the ruins of the devastating earthquake of 1999—was a terrible expression of human tragedy that took the lives of more than 17,000 in Turkey. A decade later, the outcry became a new slogan for the Hizmet movement. The voluntary rescue teams dispatched from this civil society went across the globe and supported those in need. In this section, we want to

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[10] The Greek word "ecclesia" was translated into English as "church", which means "the assembly [of believers]" and is very close in meaning to the Arabic word "jemaat". See, Greg Barton, "Progressive Islamic Thought, Civil Society and the Gülen Movement in the National Context," n. 4.

[11] M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

[12] See, *e.g.*, Bernhard Platzdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 107-114.

[13] Greg Barton, "Progressive Islamic Thought, Civil Society and the Gülen Movement in the National Context," p. 7.

explore where this public awareness of civic engagement comes from and, moreover, how the issue of recognition is related to the ideologies of redistribution.

The roots of this modern Turkish crusade are deep and can be traced back to the late Ottoman period, when Islamic foundations and other philanthropic institutions emerged. At that time, so-called *waqfs* gradually developed into full-fledged institutions that were aimed at financing public services and facilities such as mosques, churches, dervish convents, schools, libraries, hospitals, and facilities for the poor regardless of their religious, ethnic, and cultural origins. There are records of tens of thousands of Ottoman *waqfs* in the general Directorate of Philanthropic Foundations in Ankara, as well as in the Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archives in Istanbul.[14]

The offspring of such institutes have managed to survive to the present day. They sometimes emerged as a viable alternative for providing public services in fields where governments appeared to fail. In Turkey, where the old tradition of multiculturalism and humanitarianism managed to live on, we have witnessed that some private initiatives have even transcended national boundaries in order to provide education, healthcare, and organizational support abroad.

The ability of Gülen's civic entrepreneurship attracted a wide variety of supporters throughout Turkey and the world. The idea of *hizmet* (service) was introduced relatively recently by Fethullah Gülen. In a sermon, Gülen declared, "The philosophy of our service is that we open a house somewhere and, with the patience of a spider, we lay our web to wait for people to get caught in the web; and we teach those who do. We don't lay the web to eat or consume them but to show them the way to their resurrection, to blow life into their dead bodies and souls, to give them a life".[15]

Hizmet turns out to be a relatively durable root paradigm that frames the cultural map of Turkish-Muslim society. In the past, the idea of conquest has been central to Ottoman-Turkish society. Those taking part in the process of conquest are called *gazi*, and their activity is called *gaza*. Serif Madin considers *gazi* to be an example of a "root paradigm".[16] "Root paradigm" is a term characterizing clusters of meaning that serve as cultural "maps" for individuals; that is, they enable persons to

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[14] Fethullah-gulen.net, "The Voice of Tolerance: The Gulen Movement as a Base for a Future Global Civil Society," 8 July 2011 (http://www.fethullah-gulen.net/gulen-movement/gulen-movement-society/).

[15] R. Krespin, "The Upcoming Elections in Turkey (2): The AKP's Political Power Base," Inquiry & Analysis Series Report #375, MEMRI, 19 July 2007 (http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/263/0/2301.htm).

[16] Serif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change* (New York: SUNY Press, 1989), p. 3; cited in Mucahit Bilici, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey," *The Muslim World*, 96 (January 2006), p. 4.

find a path in their own culture. Such paradigms affect the form, timing, and style of behavior of those who bear them. The *gazi-gaza* cluster makes up a cultural constellation that is still present in contemporary Turkey. It shapes the social actions of groups in different ways.[17] On the other hand, as Etienne Copeaux has emphasized, the concept of *hizmet* is rather resilient, since "the word itself is helpful to fit the Turks in with 'otherness'".[18]

Accordingly, nationalism is rarely presented by Turkish nationalists as an ideology of simple superiority. Rather, it is a "guardian" nationalism that claims to serve the best of something that is by definition considered sacred. The popular idea that Turks accepted Islam without any resistance is another assertion of Turkish nationalism.[19]

The transition to republican nationalism did not take an anti-Western position.[20] That is, this version of Turkish nationalism developed in the early years of the Republic, and "the others" were the Ottomans and Islam. The new identity was constructed on the idea of a rupture with the Ottoman-Islamic past. However, the rupture took place mostly in terms of content rather than form. Serif Mardin's works shed light on the relationship of continuity between the Ottomans and Turkey.[21] *Gaza*, as the Ottoman form of *hizmet*, is replaced by the new ones in the Republic. As territorial *gaza* is neither possible nor reasonable anymore, ideological/religious (and economic) service is the only feasible form of *hizmet* for Islamic identity. With the shift from *gaza* to *hizmet*, Islamic identities not only perpetuate the Islamic mission (*da'wah*), but also experience a process of democratization that states that, using the words of Said Nursi, success in modern society is possible with consent and persuasion, but not coercion.[22] The concept of *hizmet* emerges as a point of interpenetration between Islam and Turkish nationalism. Therefore, a proper understanding of Gülen's Hizmet movement requires a focus on the interaction between Islam and Turkish nationalism.

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[17] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change*, p. 4; cited in Bilici, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey," p. 5.

[18] Etienne Copeaux, "Hizmet: A Keyword in the Turkish Historical Narrative," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 14 (Spring 1996), p. 97; cited in Bilici, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey," p. 5.

[19] Bilici, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey," p. 5.

[20] Çağlar Keyder, "The Dilemma of Cultural Identity on the Margin of Europe," *Review* (Branand Braudel Center), 16 (Winter 1993), p. 24; cited in Bilici, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey," p. 5.

[21] Serif Mardin, *Din ve Ideoloji* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1983); cited in Bilici, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey," p. 5.

[22] Said Nursi, *Divan-I Harb-I Orfi* (Istanbul: Sozler Publications, 1989), p. 49; cited in Bilici, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey," p. 6.

In his early years, Nursi was an enthusiastic supporter of Ottoman constitutionalism.[23] However, the years that saw the transition from the Ottoman state to the Republic also saw the transition from the Old Said to the New Said.[24] The New Said increasingly recognized that the challenges Muslims were facing were neither political nor military, but ideological. Nursi has been considered not only a theologian but also an intellectual who, in addition to his other concerns, attempted to bridge the gap between Islamic identity and modernity.[25]

Today, the most populous and influential post-Nursi group is under the leadership of Gülen. Fethullah Gülen positions his identity at the heart of conservatism, which is a middle way between nationalism and Islam. The conservative political style shapes Gülen's public discourse as well. For Gülen, the transition from the Ottoman state to the Turkish Republic has created very little erosion in the sacred attributes of the Turkish state. Education, business, and media networks are the foundations of Gülen's Hizmet movement, which aims to make Turkey a powerful Islamic country. The Ottoman state is the prototype for his project. Yet current conditions are completely different from those that existed in the Ottoman period. Therefore, attempts to revitalize Muslim society can be successful only through the use of modern tools.

Among the movement's three basic fields of interests and sources of power—educational institutions, business institutions, and the media—the last has played a key role in the articulation of the movement's politics. In particular, the Journalists' and Writers' Foundation (JWF) was the public relations instrument of the Gülen community throughout the 1990s. The activities of the JWF range from "Ramadan Dinners" to "football game organizations", and from "Conferences of Inter-Religious Dialogue" to "celebrity awards". The JWF sponsored the production of a film and continues to publish books on co-existence and dialogue within and between cultures. Gülen's famous visit to the Vatican and his meeting with Pope John Paul II was one of the landmark activities of the Foundation.

Launched for the regulation of Hizmet's public image, the JWF worked hard to reveal the nature of the movement to the general public. The activities of the JWF reflect the nature of the representational practices of the Gülen community. The

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[23] Said Nursi, *Münazarat* (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yayınları, 1991), pp. 22-26; cited in Bilici, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey," p. 6.

[24] Sukran Vahide, *The Author of the Risale-i Nur: Bediuzzaman Said Nursi* (Istanbul: Sözler Publications, 1992), pp. 180-84.

[25] Mardin, *Din ve Ideoloji*, p. 13; cited in Bilici, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey," p. 6.

case of Gülen's Hizmet movement shows the centrality of the media in the struggle over the image of Islam and strategies of religious social movements.

If the above discussion can be understood as explaining Gülen's call for a better understanding of civilizational and religious pluralism, a moderate way of practicing Islam, and the coexistence of different ethnic and religious affiliations, then we also must discuss the other side of the coin—redistribution. According to one line of argument, emphasizing pluralism would weaken pro-distribution coalitions by diverting time, energy, and money from redistribution to recognition. Another line of argument suggests that pluralism weakens redistribution by eroding trust and solidarity among citizens, hence eroding popular support for redistribution. Pluralism is said to erode solidarity because it emphasize differences, rather than commonalities, between citizens. Citizens have historically supported the welfare state, and been willing to make sacrifices to support their disadvantaged co-citizens, because they viewed these co-citizens as "one of us"—all of whom were bound by a common identity and sense of belonging. However, pluralism is said to corrode this common identity. Pluralism tells citizens that what divides them into separate ethno-cultural groups is more important than what unites them, and that co-citizens from other groups are not really "one of us".[26]

On the other hand, Nancy Fraser argued that redistribution cannot be separated from recognition, such as treating distribution as a derivative. She proposes a "perspectival dualist" analysis that casts recognition and redistribution as co-fundamental and mutually irreducible dimensions of justice.[27] Therefore, if we accept Nancy Fraser's argument, then no matter how strong the crowding-out or eroding effects are, redistribution will always be heeded by social movements such as Hizmet, which also cares about the issue of recognition.

As we are well aware of, financial giving is an inherent characteristic of participants in the Hizmet movement.[28] Implicit in this observation is the question of how religion relates to civil society, and how civil society relates to religion. A study by Anthony Gill and Erik Lundsgaarde found that the greater proportion of GDP that was spent on government welfare, the more non-religious people there

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[26] See, *e.g.*, Keith Banting and Kymlicka Will, *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[27] See, *e.g.*, Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange,* trans. by Joel Golb, James Ingram and Christiane Wilke (London: Verso, 2003).

[28] See, *e.g.*, H.R. Ebaugh, *The Gülen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam* (Vienna: Springer Science and Business Media B.V., 2010).

were and the lower church attendance was.[29] This held true even after statistically adjusting for other factors such as per capita GDP, urbanization, government regulation of religion, and religious pluralism. So, this seems to imply that the more religious people are, the less they are concerned about sharing with everyone else—religion and social welfare (or redistribution) are inversely related to each other. Thus, a pro-religion civil society such as Hizmet could be inferred by many as being less inclined on the issue of social redistribution.

In order to clarify what is behind Hizmet's mentality concerning social welfare and, specifically, fair redistribution, we may want to refer to Gülen's conception of "Muslin subjectivity". Gülen promotes a theology of action that seeks to re-enchant the world with meaning through Islamic service. To enable this life of action, Gülen articulates an Islamic conception of human subjectivity.[30] The true believer, Gülen writes, is conscientious of the fact that God "is the sole source of power and wealth".[31] They are free to transform and create according to their needs, as long as their wealth and activities recognize the source of Creation and free will.

Furthermore, as human subjectivity is linked to a higher authority, it is necessarily limited. Gülen's conception approaches what Farzin Vahdat calls "mediated subjectivity", which limits willful conduct by the compulsion to act in God's favor and to ascribe all accomplishments to its divine source.[32] This limited, interactive form of subjectivity "is contingent on God's subjectivity. Thus, although human subjectivity is not denied, it is never independent of God's subjectivity and, in this sense, it is 'mediated'".[33] In Gülen's view, a Muslim cannot passively submit (*Islam*) before God, but must actively serve him (*hizmet*) and strive to please him (*jihad*). *Hizmet*, a central conception in Gülen's theology, refers to the outward expression of inner spirituality and consciousness of God. Gülen compels Muslims to reject the Sufi emphasis on inner spiritual perfection, and to apply their internal faith to this world: "Those who always feel themselves, in the presence of God, do

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[29] Anthony Gill and Erik Lundsgaarde, "Welfare State Spending and Religiosity: A Cross-National Analysis," *Rationality and Society*, 16 (November 2004), pp. 399-436.

[30] By "subjectivity" we will abide by Erol Gulay's idea of the autonomous, willful individual attempting to master the world through a program of "positive action". See Erol N. Gulay, "The Gülen Phenomenon: A Neo-Sufi Challenge to Turkey's Rival Elite?" *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, 16 (Spring 2007), n. 68.

[31] M. Fethullah Gülen, *Emerald Hills of the Heart: Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism* (蘇非思想：伊斯蘭的心靈旅 Chinese translation by Ding Nai-Jing (丁迺靜)) (Taipei: The Fountain (希泉), 2005).

[32] Farzin Vahdat, *God and Juggernaut: Iran's Intellectual Encounter with Modernity* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), p. 134; cited in Gulay, "The Gülen Phenomenon," p. 47.

[33] Vahdat, *God and Juggernaut,* p. 134; cited in Gulay, "The Gülen Phenomenon," p. 47.

not need to seclude themselves from people".[34] His theological emphasis on *hizmet* represents the most important conceptual departure from Nursi and the Naksibendis. While Nursi and the Naksibendis do not condemn this-worldly activity, they also do not emphasize it as a foundational principle.[35] The singular focus on ceaseless *hizmet* represents Gülen's unique contribution to contemporary Turkish Islamic thought.

According to Gülen, the translation of inner spirituality into "pietistic activism" is what ultimately ensures salvation and the fulfillment of God's will.[36] As a "new feature in Turkish religious life", this austere ethic of worldly asceticism has led to the "rationalization of social relationships" and is the means to salvation.[37] Thus, Gülen's followers are motivated by the possibility of earning eternal reward through a methodical course of activity and belief. Attaining salvation becomes a rational, programmatic function of uniting one's material and ideal interests in the singular pursuit of God's grace. Gülen commands the Muslim community to "establish science and exploit natural resources by discovering the divine law of nature and reflecting on natural phenomena".[38] Wealth, in turn, obtains religious value if it is used piously in the direction of God's will, for "more blessing means more responsibility".[39] Therefore, the accumulation of wealth is not profane or prohibited, but rather encouraged as a useful deed.

Gülen legitimizes socioeconomic difference and defends social hierarchies, ascribing them to divine mandate. Social stratification "sustains the variety of human occupations, a fundamental element of human social life. This variation causes people to need one another and to establish mutual good relations".[40] He adds: "God Almighty created people with different dispositions and potentials so that human social life would be maintained through mutual help and the division of labor".[41] Meanwhile, he views poverty as an undesirable state for the responsible

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[34] Gülen, *Emerald Hills of the Heart*.

[35] Mehmet Aydin, "The Problem of Theodicy in the Risale-I Nur," in Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi (ed.), *Islam at the Crossroads: On the Life and Thought of Bendiuzzaman Said Nursi* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), p. 222 (http://nursistudies.com/teblig.php?tno=288); cited in Gulay, "The Gülen Phenomenon," p. 49.

[36] See, *e.g.*, M. Elizabeth Özdalga, "World Asceticism in Islamic Casting: Fethullah Gulen's Inspired Piety and Activism," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, 17 (Fall 2000), p. 88.

[37] Gülen, *Emerald Hills of the Heart*.

[38] M. Fethullah Gülen, *Prophet Muhammad: Aspect of His Life* (最後的先知：穆罕默德的生命面貌, Chinese translation by 彭廣愷, 馬顯光, 黃思恩) (Taipei: The Fountain (希泉), 2004).

[39] M. Fethullah Gülen, *Essentials of the Islamic Faith* (信仰珠璣, Chinese translation by 葉大瑾, 黃思恩) (Taipei: The Fountain (希泉), 2006).

[40] Gülen, *Essentials of the Islamic Faith*.

[41] Gülen, *Prophet Muhammad: Aspect of His Life*.

Muslim rather than as a guarantor of salvation: "It is not poverty in itself that is good, but rather the state of mind that has disciplined (and triumphed over) the worldly self and set its sight upon eternal life".[42]

The Gülen community's organizational and ideational forms are shaped and constrained by opportunity spaces and material forces. At the same time, the movement reshapes and re-imagines those social forces through a process of participation and engagement. Gülen constructs counter-publics for his followers by cross-fertilizing Islamic ideas with contextual realities to create an activist theology for the "modern Muslim". His engagement with politics and society secularizes and contextualizes his Islamic message, while his theology of Muslim striving Islamizes and sanctifies his followers' worldly activities. With interests in finance, media, education, and politics, Gülen's community has emerged as a "rival elite" organized around an Islamic ethic of solidarity and service.[43] By a process of engagement and colonization, this new elite seeks to penetrate the prevailing Kemalist social and political structure and to undermine its normative, epistemological, financial, and social foundations.

3. From Emulation to Innovation

Since the 1900s, most religious organizations in Indonesia, including Muhammadiyah, have become part of civil society feeling the need to improve civil life, largely independent of state intervention, by strengthening the value of voluntarism and philanthropy. Because of a lack of resources and political will on the part of government, it becomes increasingly important that religious people take responsibility for their personal uplift and for the betterment of their community. Effective religious philanthropy is instrumental in creating and maintaining public confidence in philanthropic traditions—voluntary association, giving, and action.

Islam, as other religions, preaches voluntarism in the sense of being caring, sharing with others, or offering money to those in distress. In Islam, there are concepts such as *zakat* and *sadaqa*. In *zakat*, it is obligatory for a person to give a portion of his income to charity. In *sadaqa*, the scope is wider, as even those who have nothing tangible to give can offer *sadaqa* in the form of a glass of water to the thirsty, or simply a smile and a kind word.[44]

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[42] M. Fethullah Gülen, *Questions & Answers about Islam* (請問伊斯蘭, Chinese translation by 黃思恩)(Taipei: The Fountain (希泉), 2007).

[43] Niko Kielstra, "Law and Reality in Modern Islam," in Ernest Gellner (ed.), *Islamic Dilemmas: Reformers, Nationalists, and Industrialization: The Southern Shore of the Mediterranean* (New York: Mouton, 1985), p. 15; cited in Gulay," The Gülen Phenomenon," p. 54.

[44] See, *e.g.*, Jonathon Rigg, *Southeast Asia: The Human Landscape of Modernisation and Development*. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 63.

The above-mentioned ideas constitute the ideological context in which Ahmad Dahlan founded Muhammadiyah. Ideologically, Dahlan was one of those who opted for a combination of Western and Islamic reformist ideas as the basis for his activities. His concern for the poverty and backwardness of the people of the Netherlands East Indies, the majority of whom belonged to the Islamic *ummah*, led him to the fields of education and health. Reflecting the movement's objective of drawing from Western and Islamic reformist ideas, Muhammadiyah schools and hospitals combine modern methods with the teaching of religious subjects. These Muhammadiyah institutions have spread throughout the major islands of Indonesia. Today, Muhammadiyah's mission is still the same, but despite substantial improvements, the facilities in its schools, hospitals, and clinics are far from adequate.

The undemocratic practices employed during the Indonesian New Order regime (1968-1998) resulted in its internal weakness.[45] This internal weakness has led the state to use repressive means to maintain its political power and restrict the political movement of the people. In turn, this policy has weakened its apparatuses. Its bureaucracy has become so weak that it is unable to deal with social and economic problems and to implement the state's program on its own. It needs to allow or encourage social groups to participate in addressing problems of common interest. It has to negotiate and work together with them. For, example, the Indonesian state has never been able to adequately provide education for its people, both in terms of quantity and quality. Muhammadiyah's numerous schools help to cover the shortage, thus complementing the state ideology of *Pancasila*. This helps to propagate the state vision of Islam. All things considered, the state has deemed it worthwhile to subsidize private schools such as those of Muhammadiyah. This exemplified the mutual relationship that the Indonesian state can have with members of civil society.

Such a relationship between the state and civil society has its root in the colonial experience. As the colonial state moved into the twentieth century, it had to create groups of local people who could help the state manage itself and the population. Thus, an ethical policy was launched into the lives and minds of Indonesians, which created new aspirations. In turn, this development nurtured a national

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[45] Syed Farid Alatas, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in Indonesia and Malaysia: The Rise of the Post-Colonial State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

consciousness that would later give birth to the Indonesian independence movement.[46]

When independence came, the Muslims had an opportunity to turn the tide. They wanted the national state to help their poor and underfunded schools. The Ministry for Religious Affairs established a great number of Islamic religious schools, including schools for religious teachers and institutes for Islamic studies, and it became the supplier and employer of religious teachers. A state law was made requiring the teaching of religion in all schools and colleges.[47] Today, the Ministry pays the salary of many teachers whom it assigns to work in the under-funded private schools. Since most of these schools are run by Islamic organizations, including Muhammadiyah, they have become the main beneficiaries of the Ministry's program.

Structurally, Muhammadiyah's organization consists of *pengurus pusat* (national office, PP), *pengurus wilayah* (provincial office, PW), *pengurus daerah* (district office on the *kabupaten* level, or *daerah*), *pengurus cabang* (branch office on the *kecamatan* level, or *cabang*), and *pengurus ranting* (sub-branch offices on the *desa* level, or *ranting*).[48] The national office regulates the non-profit activities of different levels of Muhammadiyah's offices. For example, in the area of education, there is an ascending order whereby an Aisyiyah branch handles a kindergarten; a Muhammadiyah branch handles an elementary school; a Muhammadiyah district office handles a junior high school and a high school; and a Muhammadiyah provincial office handles a college. In the area of health, only district-level offices and above are allowed to manage such a service. Muhammadiyah's health services come in three categories: clinic, maternity and pediatric clinic, and hospital. Within this framework, the handling of maternity and pediatric clinics is relegated to the Aisyiyah.[49]

Muhammadiyah, as well as the NU, has a long tradition of self-subsistence and financial independence. This is manifest in the thousands of schools that the two organizations have, with NU supporters running the majority of the traditionalist Islamic boarding schools, and Muhammadiyah supporters running the modernist

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[46] Ibrahim Rustam, "Indonesian Civil Society 2006: A Long Journey to a Civil Society" (CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, 2006), pp. 18-20 (http://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_Indonesia_Country_Report.pdf).

[47] Deliar Noer, *Administrasi Islam di Indonesia* [The Administration of Islam in Indonesia] (Jakarta: C.V. Rajawali, 1983), p. 70; cited in Muhammad Fuad, "Civil Society in Indonesia: The Potential and Limits of Muhammadiyah," *SOJOURN*, 17 (2002), p. 138.

[48] The administration units below the state in Indonesia are *propinsi* (province), *kebupaten* (district), *kecamatan* (sub-district) and *desa* (village).

[49] Fuad, "Civil Society in Indonesia," p. 140.

schools and hospitals. The scale of these undertakings suggests a substantial level of grassroots support, which also explains their ability to resist political pressure from the state.

Some have argued that the history of Muhammadiyah is the history of efforts to stem Christian missionary activities in Indonesia.[50] The latter usually have higher quality of service and social status of the patients. The Protestants and Catholics have well-organized national associations. Even though the Muslims also have a national Hospital Consultative Assembly, its impact is quite limited. Therefore, a system of local cooperative networks among Muhammadiyah hospitals has emerged, in which new clinics affiliate themselves with hospitals that are already well established.[51]

In Indonesia today, the state provides about 40% of the health and education services.[52] This makes participation by civil society in these fields crucial for the purpose of filling the gap. Therefore, the New Order regime, while intolerant of civil society seeking a role in political matters, would encourage organizations like Muhammadiyah to get involved in its social and educational programs. State interference in Muhammadiyah's programs is a mixture of political and ideological control with assistance to help them grow.[53]

The mixed nature of state interference—of stringent surveillance and useful assistance—is manifest in Muhammadiyah's educational activities. All over Indonesia, the state conducts surveillance on Muhammadiyah's informal group discussions. For example, in the village of Bayeman, the Muhammmadiyah discussion group meets on Sunday mornings and is open to everybody—men, women, and youth. This discussion group was the activity that attracted the attention of local military and police intelligence. The intelligence operatives systematically focused on the speakers who were likely to be political in their speeches. In spite of the constant surveillance, the Bayeman members knew they were not considered a problem by the local military. According to the chair, "We were trusted by Kodim because we never caused any problem.[54] Some

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[50] Alwi Shihab, *Membendung: Respons Gerekan Muhammadiyah Terhadap Penetrasi Misi Kristen di Indonesia* [Stemming the Tide: Muhammadiyah Response against the Christian Missionary Penetration in Indonesia] (Bandung: Mizan, 1998); cited in Fuad, "Civil Society in Indonesia," p. 144.

[51] Fuad, "Civil Society in Indonesia," pp. 144-145.

[52] Fuad, "Civil Society in Indonesia," p. 148.

[53] Fuad, "Civil Society in Indonesia," p. 148.

[54] Kodim stands for *komando distrik militer*—military and administrative district.

Muhammadiyah members had good relations with the Tripika,[55] they could convince them that Muhammadiyah at Bayeman was good".[56]

Both Muhammadiyah in Indonesia and Hizmet in Turkey are typical religion-inspired civil societies. According to Yavuz, it "has not been the most marginalized sectors of society that have been politicized by Islam but, on the contrary, it has been the most upwardly mobile ones who led the current wave of social and political reforms".[57] But after a brief imprisonment in 1971 for religious expression following the military takeover of the government, Gülen adopted an explicitly apolitical course for his movement.[58] In the same vein, Muhammadiyah also refrained from political involvement, yet simultaneously took advantage of the toleration it enjoyed under both the Dutch and the post-independence governments, in order to develop from modest beginnings into a stable, financially solid organization that actively pursues a range of socio-religious activities.[59] It was true that while engaging in the practices of party politics, political Muslims still maintained the socio-religious and educational functions of their own non-governmental organizations, such as Muhammadiyah and Hizmet. In fact, their involvement in party politics and the bureaucracy, to some extent, had been instrumental in these organizations' ability to carry out socio-religious and educational programs. Nonetheless, the inclination of many of their leaders and activists to define politics in a narrow sense—that is, exclusively in terms of party politics—contributed greatly to the neglect of the political impact of these two organizations.

On the other hand, compared to Muhammadiyah's struggle to deal with state surveillance and rely on state subsidies for some of its teachers, the Hizmet movement has been more successful in its ability to attract substantial financial contributions from Turkish businessmen, entrepreneurs, and other upper-middle class professionals, and therefore it can adopt a more aloof position vis-à-vis the state. Over the last four decades, the latter have contributed billions of dollars to finance the numerous preparatory schools established by the movement as well as its numerous service projects, both within Turkey and worldwide. The movement's

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[55] Tripika stands for Tri Pimpinan Kecamatan, that is, a trio of officials making up the leadership of *kecamatan* (sub-district): the *kecamatan* head, the military chief, and the police chief.

[56] Fuad, "Civil Society in Indonesia," p. 149.

[57] Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, p. 270.

[58] Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, p. 183.

[59] Nevertheless, early in the New Order, the support of Muhammadiyah and other major Islamic organizations for Masyumi still appeared unrelenting, and they called for a rehabilitation of the party. See for example Allan A. Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," *Asian Survey*, 8(12) (December 1968), p. 1005.

financial position is much more proficient than many other Islamic groups worldwide, including Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah.[60]

The fortune of the Gülen movement improved as a result of the reforms of former Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, who ruled Turkey during the 1980s and early 1990s. Ozal lifted the ban against Gülen and his movement from conducting public preaching activities, so that Gülen could publicly promote his ideas and compete against those promoted by more conservative Islamic groups.[61] In 1982, as part of his policy to open Turkey's economy, Ozal ended the state monopoly of the education sector and allowed private schools, including those sponsored by religious groups, to be established. In the following year, Gülen and his movement took advantage of this opportunity by establishing the first of the Gülen schools modeled after his curricular ideas of the "Golden generation". In the same year, Gülen activists founded two Gülen-inspired high schools, one in Izmir and one in Istanbul. Many of the teaching staffs and financial sponsors for the schools are devout Muslims who are members of the Gülen movement. The schools use English as the primary language of instruction, and the curricula are largely secular, with primary coursework on science and mathematics. The only formal religious instruction taught at the school is a one-hour course in comparative religions, which use syllabi and textbooks selected by the Turkish state.[62] Due to their high-quality instruction, success in placing its students in the highly-competitive Turkish state universities, and personalized attention by the teachers, the schools quickly became popular among upper-middle class families in the two cities and attracted a large number of students. The success of these schools led Gülen activists to establish more schools throughout Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s. By 1999, the movement had established 150 high schools, 150 dormitories (*dershanes*), and numerous schools all over Turkey.[63]

In the 1990s, the movement began to establish schools beyond Turkey's borders, after Fethullah Gülen made a call for the movement to establish a presence in

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[60] Despite its claims to have up to 60 million followers in Indonesia, NU's financial assets (which consist of a small number of estate holdings, primarily its headquarter building in Jakarta) is estimated to be worth approximately $4.2 Million. See Martin Van Bruinessen, "NU: New Leadership, New Policies?" *Inside Indonesia*, 100 (April-June 2010) (http://www.insideindonesia.org/weekly-articles/new-leadership-new-policies), p. 7. This figure is a far cry from the assets of the Hizmet Movement. No reliable estimates exist for the worth of Muhammadiyah's financial assets.

[61] As a matter of fact, during this period the Ozal regime often called Gülen "the Muslim preacher of liberalism" in order to compare and distinguish him from the revivalist/fundamentalist preachers. SeeYavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey,* p. 183.

[62] Ebaugh, *The Gülen Movement*, pp. 29-30.

[63] Bekim Agai, "Fethullah Gülen and His Movement's Islamic Ethic of Education," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, 11 (Spring 2002), p. 27.

countries of Central Asia such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan in view of their historical ties with Turkey in the time of the Ottoman Empire.[64] Soon afterwards, the school system expanded further to many other countries, including those located in the Balkans, Western Europe, Asia and the Pacific, as well as North America. It is estimated that currently there are over 1,000 Gülen-affiliated schools operating in over 100 countries.[65] Together, these schools employ over 6,000 teachers.[66] In addition to these educational institutions, the movement operates seven universities, six private hospitals, numerous smaller clinics, and an international disaster relief organization—*Kimse Yok Mu*.[67] Furthermore, the movement operates a commercial bank named Bank Asya, which is run on the Islamic principle of no interest on loans.[68] Except for Bank Asya, which was established for commercial purposes, all of these organizations were developed as a vehicle for its members to perform their community service (*hizmet*) activities.

This is where the Gülen movement can be distinguished from Muhammadiyah. The success of the Gülen movement in establishing thousands of educational institutions worldwide as well as a strong media presence in Turkey can be attributed to the support of upper-middle class Islamic businessmen, who organized in the Anatolian region where Gülen and his movement originated. This group of businessmen is commonly known as "the Anatolian Tigers." It consists of self-made businessmen who developed their businesses during the 1960s and 1970s with little or no assistance or patronage from the Turkish state, which at that time concentrated its patronage among secular-minded businessmen. They tend support free-market ideas, democratic government, and a strong role for civil society.[69]

Fethullah Gülen encouraged these businessmen to become successful in their commercial endeavors so that they could accumulate wealth, which in turn could be used to support charitable service projects such as education—not for their personal benefit but for the students.[70] Some of them also became supporters of the movement because they pursued their education in one of the *dershanes* that was established by Gülen in the late 1960s and 1970s.

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[64] Ebaugh, *The Gülen Movement*, p. 43.

[65] Alexander R. Arifianto, "Faith, Moral Authority, and Politics: The Making of 'Progressive Islam' in Indonesia and Turkey," paper presented at the 2012 Western Political Science Association (WPSA) Annual Meeting, Portland (22-24 March 2012) (http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/meet/2012/arifianto.pdf), p. 31.

[66] Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, p. 193.

[67] Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, p. 193; Ebaugh, *The Gülen Movement*, p. 4.

[68] Ebaugh, *The Gülen Movement*, p. 85.

[69] Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, p. 88.

[70] Ebaugh, *The Gülen Movement*, p. 37.

Another aspect of the growth of the Gülen movement, which can be distinguished from that of Muhammadiyah, is the relatively close relationship the movement has had with some political figures and officials within the Turkish state. One of the goals of the movement is to change Turkey's restrictive (or assertive) secularist policy to one that is more pragmatic and tolerant toward religious expression and viewpoints. This is why Gülen frequently made references to the state-religion relationships during the Ottoman period. Gülen believes this serves as a model for closer and more cooperative state-religion relations in Turkey. However, Gülen and his movement are always careful not to push their demand for change too far, and they avoid any confrontation with the state and its apparatus. It refuses to publicly endorse any specific candidates or political parties during election campaigns.[71] Instead, Gülen and his associates engage in developing personal relationships with politicians and government bureaucrats in order to educate them about their movement and its positive contributions in the fields of education, commerce, and other social services.[72] This is what we have discussed previously about how the movement strategically gained recognition and successfully fulfilled its goals of redistribution.

Gülen held regular meetings with government officials and politicians in order to develop closer ties with them. He had a close relationship with the late Prime Minister Turgut Ozal in the 1980s and early 1990s. Gülen and his movement presented themselves as the moderate alternative to other Islamic groups in Turkey, e.g. the Mili Gorus movement that was linked to former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan.[73] Their strategy paid off: the movement enjoyed substantial growth and success during the Ozal premiership, and many of its schools and its newspaper *Zaman* were established during this period. In the 1990s, Gülen also had close relationships with former Prime Ministers Mesut Yilmaz, Tansu Ciller, and Bülent Ecevit, as well as former President Suleyman Demirel. They expressed support for Gülen and his projects by paying visits to the Gülen schools and attending their ceremonies.[74]

4. Conclusion

Fethullah Gülen and his movement seek to create a non-Western modernity in contrast to Kemalist non-modern Westernization. Of course, this movement is not merely a modernization movement. The Hizmet movement is a modern, consent-

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[71] Arifianto, "Faith, Moral Authority, and Politics," p. 34.

[72] Arifianto, "Faith, Moral Authority, and Politics," p. 34.

[73] Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, p. 43.

[74] Ihsan Yilmaz, "State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey," *The Muslim World*, 95 (July 2005), p. 397.

based religious movement that sees what it considers to be the "good" as the best strategy for transforming society. Its activities on philanthropy and social welfare, especially in education and health services, could be inferred as having been inspired by Muhammadiyah in Indonesia and as being a renowned echo of it in the Muslim world.

Fethullah Gülen can be positioned beside Said Nursi in terms of his conservatism. His ideology is geared towards a final reconciliation between religion and state. His movement, like all other Islamic movements in Turkey, has oscillated for a long time between political statism and economic liberalism. However, we can confidently conclude that both Gülen and his movement are in constant evolution in relation to global, political, and social changes. With a shift of emphasis from *gaza* (conquest) in the Ottoman period to *hizmet* (service), the movement ingeniously perpetuates the Islamic identity into a society with consent and persuasion, not coercion. This call for a moderate way of practicing Islam also implies a more active and outward expression of Islamic spirituality. Socioeconomic difference, which culminates in poverty as an undesirable state, causes people to need one another and to establish good mutual relations. Thus, religiousness and social welfare, as illustrated in Hizmet's activities, can be mutually reinforcing rather than mutually antagonistic.

The Hizmet movement may have been emulating some of Muhammadiyah's vision in establishing schools and hospitals in order to nurture national consciousness and to fill the gap in the state's deficiencies in social services, but it could also be said that the former transcended some of the latter's achievements and dissolved some of its barriers. Muhammadiyah may have been the leading civil society in Indonesia in supporting modernist schools and hospitals, but it still cannot avoid constant surveillance from the government and its indirect subsidies, especially in teachers' salaries. Furthermore, the Hizmet movement has enjoyed relatively close relationships with political figures, yet it does not have to worry about infiltration from political parties. This could be the result of Hizmet's long-term nurturing of social elites through its schools, who served later as a conduit for the movement to establish good partnerships with the government. On the other hand, Muhammadiyah cannot retain a clear-cut relationship with the government because it needs the latter's financial assistance; thus, it cannot prevent some of its members from being directly involved in political activities. Even though Muhammadiyah has repeatedly denied having had further relationships with political parties, it might have wondered why it could not be more like Hizmet in Turkey.