

重返萬隆？東協區域經濟整合的回顧與前瞻

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在1776年美國獨立宣言簽署之時，托馬斯·潘恩(Thomas Paine)在他所發行的*Common Sense*上發出如此怨言：「自由正在全球各地被追殺，亞洲與非洲早就將她驅逐出境。歐洲將她視為陌生人，而英國則嚴重警告要她儘速離開。」對潘恩而言，政治自由與民主在各處都被珍惜著，不過卻也幾乎在各處被糟蹋著。他希望，美國將會是個不一樣的地方。不過，他應該不會想到，將近一百八十年之後，在印尼的萬隆召開了一個號稱聚集亞非兩洲主要國家的高峰會議，目的是要擺脫西方國家的影響，建立一個屬於他們自己的區域，一個他們自己的自由民主理念不會受到糟蹋的區域。

1955年的萬隆會議還出現了一個令人興奮的迷思，也就是中國與印度將帶領亞洲各國建立一發展中國家的區域，可惜這個迷思到了1960年代很快就破滅了。印度呢？它走進了內部的歧途，並與巴基斯坦交惡，而且令人感到諷刺的是，巴基斯坦還曾是可倫坡計畫(Colombo Powers)的成員，並為萬隆會議的共同發起國之一呢！中國呢？它很快即違背了自己在萬隆所發不干預他國的誓言，這是萬隆宣言裡的十大原則之一。更重要的是，中印戰爭的興起，讓人對兩國曾宣稱要聯合領導亞洲各國，感到十分失望。至於日本呢？它一直陷入過去之帝國主義的歷史記憶裡，也不敢再提任何區域合作的新倡議。

當然，東南亞本身也嚴重分裂，各國內部與彼此之間的衝突不斷，尤其是蘇卡諾的悍然對抗(Konfrontasi)新成立之馬來亞聯邦。而馬來西亞第一次嘗試組成的區域組織—東南亞協會(Association of Southeast Asia, ASA)亦宣告失敗，因為未將東南亞最大的成員—印尼納入其中；它的第二次嘗試組成的團體Maphilindo(馬來西亞、菲律賓和印尼)，旨在聯合所有馬來族群，也因蘇卡諾憑藉軍事力量否認馬來西亞聯邦的合法性，而再次宣告失敗。

本文擬從萬隆會議所激發的亞太區域合作之進展，探討誰才是最合適的主導者。我們首先討論亞洲特性(Asianness)觀念的出現，接著略述民族區域主義與強權主導區域合作的興衰；然後以東南亞自主性區域合作的成形來凸顯成功的契機，而區域強權—日本與中國的興起則為區域合作帶來更多的變數；最後在略感失望之餘，提出我們的一絲期許。

亞洲特性的浮現

萬隆亞非會議雖號稱聚集亞非兩洲的國家，但實質上是以亞洲國家為主體。同時，以印尼為主導的不結盟運動可說是起始於該會議，希望能擺脫過去殖民主的掌控，憑藉彼此的力量，以達到提升發展程度的目標。該會議基本上只是一些原則的宣示，並無具體做法的協議，而且政治的目的較為明顯，所以不是協商區域經濟合作的聚會。不過，其中所隱含之亞洲特性(Asianness)的概念，則是不容忽視的。尤其在1962年嘗試成立的ASA，雖然名為一東南亞的協會，但發起者都

將自己視為更大的亞洲文化、政治與經濟內涵之一部分(譬如見, 2011: 9)。後於1967年成立的太平洋盆地經濟理事會(PBEC)、1968年開始舉行的太平洋貿易與發展會議(PAFTAD), 直到1980年成立的太平洋經濟合作理事會(PECC), 都是以大亞洲為協商合作的場域。

太平洋共同體(Pacific Community)的概念後來則逐漸轉化為亞太(Asia-Pacific或Asia Pacific)的概念, 主要是要將東協國家含括進來, 以消除他們害怕被邊緣化的疑懼, 同時亦著眼於往後要將中國吸納進來。這樣的發展, 一方面似乎又回歸到萬隆會議的初意, 特別是印尼較一廂情願的想法, 也就是要將中國攏絡到大亞洲和平發展的陣容裡。另一方面, 則又似乎與美國在戰後的想法大相逕庭。美國當時對共產中國在1954年日內瓦有關印支半島的會議的強勢介入感到疑慮, 故希望東南亞能取代中國, 成為恢復繁榮的非共之日本的主要市場和原料供應來源。美國希望東南亞能扮演將日本與中國隔絕開來的角色, 並回復戰前雙方的經濟關係, 以阻絕任何將中國重新融入區域的企圖(Montesanto, 2008: 204-5)。

在萬隆會議六十年之後, 東南亞為一特定區域的理念和事實, 絕對是無庸置疑的。而且從今天的角度來看, 這種理念和事實也比當年揭櫫的不結盟甚或和平共存等概念, 要來得有意義。同時, 中國的「和平崛起」也正在形塑著亞洲的國際政治, 這在前AIT處長和美國駐中國大使李潔明(James Lilley)的著作裡可看到深刻的描述(譬如見Lilley, 2004)。不過, 區域裡應該沒有多少人能夠了解, 今天之中國與東協的緊密互動, 實可追溯到萬隆會議。反之, 許多人所認知的萬隆會議流傳至今的遺跡, 既不是亞非國家的團結甚或非結盟運動, 也不是當年美國國務卿杜勒斯(John Dulles)的疑神疑鬼, 而是東南亞與戰後美國在此區域的經營。這也是為何歐巴馬在去年赴中參加APEC會議時, 他說:「我們還沒[玩]完, 我們這個不可或缺的國家必須管控每個地方。我們雖然在被越南羞辱並遭驅逐之後離開了, 但是我們回來了, 而且我們還是軸心(pivoting)」(見Walsh, 2014)。

民族區域主義與強權主導區域合作的興衰

而其實, 從區域合作的角度而言, 美國從未離開, 所以也沒有所謂的「回來」。誠如William Henderson在1963年所說:「只有在東南亞才看得到[亞洲]合作型態...的開始發展」, 而且那裏「逐漸加快的『區域活動』」使得該次區域成為東亞區域主義的主軸, 這是當今的南亞或東北亞都無法與其相比的(Henderson, 1962: 92)。起源於美國杜魯門主義的東南亞公約組織(SEATO)除了菲律賓和泰國之外, 受到萬隆會議之強調不結盟的影響, 一直吸收不到其他東南亞國家的成員。該組織旨在將中國防堵於東南亞之外, 而中國在萬隆會議的出現, 使得美國對該區域的規劃遭到打擊。美國的介入第二次印支衝突(越戰), 是想要持續其1949年之後的東南亞政策。而中國與東南亞在萬隆會議的接觸, 加上SEATO的擴張未成, 都讓美國的心逐漸飄離東南亞。

如果說萬隆會議使得美國對東南亞區域的規劃遭到挫折, 那似乎是針對政治或安全的層面, 而非經貿層面。不過, 萬隆會議雖普遍被視為意圖超越去殖民的

思維，並希望進一步探討建立新世界秩序的可能性，但在經濟(以及能源)合作方面，還是有所著墨。當然，1955年的萬隆會議，以及之前在1947和1949年由印度主辦的亞洲關係會議(Asian Relations Conferences)，都是經濟民族主義盛行的時期，這與已開發國家之著重貿易開放的經濟自由主義，並不相同。所以此時期所發展出來的區域主義，可以稱之為強權軌道(great power orbit)裡的區域主義(Acharya, 2014: 25)。這種區域主義首先可以美國主導並被英國支持的區域集體防衛組織為代表，像是SEATO就是為了反制中國煽動各國所帶來的威脅，而於1954年成立的區域組織。另外，這種區域主義也可以對弱小國家提供經濟援助為表徵。

不過，上述兩種區域主義的形式都無法在亞洲生根，簡言之，他們都無法成功創造有效的區域組織。印度和萬隆會議的領導者是有資格代表區域發言，可是他們沒有組織有效體制的能力；反之，SEATO背後的強權絕對不缺能力，可是又沒有代表區域的資格。具體而言，印度身為亞洲關係會議的領導者，它有能力對抗荷蘭的印尼民族運動提供實質的協助，可是卻未對胡志明提供任何協助，政治是部份的原因。印度當時的總理尼赫魯體認到，印度軍隊在亞洲和其他地區介入英國殖民時期的各種戰爭，已經惹怒了許多國家，所以不願再因介入印支半島的衝突，而使其政治情勢更趨複雜，所以它對亞洲民族運動的實質協助非常謹慎。另一方面，印度在幾世紀的殖民統治後遭遇領土分裂，並努力建立其經濟基礎之際，也發現可以使用的經濟資源實在有限。

而對泛亞洲區域主義更大的阻礙，是區域較小國家對印度和中國的疑懼。一位出席1947年在新德里的亞洲關係會議的緬甸參與者事後說：「被西方強權所統治固然很可怕，不過被亞洲強權所統治才是真的可怕」(Henderson, 1955)。在萬隆會議的時候，尼赫魯在擁護中國共產政權(當時為總理周恩來代表出席)所扮演的角色，以及他對印尼主辦國和其他代表所表現的高傲態度，讓其他國家對印度的領導權感到寒心。萬隆會議在經濟方面的結論為：「透過自助和相互協助以提升經濟發展的預備程度(Cable, 1955; 轉引自Acharya, 2014: 25)。會議呼籲採取集體行動以穩定「初級產品的價格和需求」，以及透過一致性的行動「以促使船運公司採取較合理的態度」、「更多初級原料在出口前能被加工」、「鼓勵設立國家和區域銀行以及保險公司」、「促進有關石油資訊的相互交換」，以及「促使萬隆會議與會國在國際會議前先彼此諮商」(Gilchrist, 1955; 轉引自Acharya, 2014: 25-26)。這些建議，尤其是有關石油價格資訊的交換，可能是後來石油輸出國家(OPEC)卡特爾組織的濫觴，還有要求初級產價格提升的集體協商，也是東協後來所採行的作法。此外，當時印度或中國都沒有能力提供促成區域經濟合作的資源，足以與大英國協所主導的可倫坡計畫(Colombo Plan)或日本相比擬，雖然他們對萬隆會議的經濟議題均極感興趣，但在當時並無足夠的政治地位以擔任領導者。

另一方面，美國除了在SEATO上一籌莫展之外，詹森政府在1960年代中所提出的東南亞發展協會(SEADA)之藍圖，展現美國對亞洲發展的長期承諾，形式

上將擴大亞洲領導者的角色，並加強亞洲各國的團結(U.S. Department of State, 2000)。美國官方估計支持這樣的區域計畫，「在十年期間內需要64億美元的資金，亦即較現有水準增加20%」，而若包括軍事援助，則十年內的金額將達80億美元(U.S. Department of State, 2000)。

東南亞自主區域合作的成形

不過雖然美國願意投入大量的資源，但是SEADA計畫並未能展開，部份的原因，是當時的越戰轉移了注意以及其所導致的困境，詹森政府無法兼顧經濟和國內政治事務，使得他極難取得支持和資源。另一方面，也沒有跡象顯示東南亞國家熱衷於支持該計畫，主要因若干本土區域主義的興起，包括1960年的東南亞協會(ASA)和1963年的Maphilindo。雖如前述，兩者都很快夭折，但這些先期的努力最後終於開花結果——東南亞國協(ASEAN)於1967年成立，這是一個正式的跨政府組織。ASEAN基於隱性的規範協商，給予印尼(在蘇哈托新政權之下)某種合法性，也就是印尼對其他較小鄰國(像是馬來西亞與新加坡)自我節制(不干預、不脅迫)，而其鄰國則接受印尼為區域長者(elder)，雖說不是本質上的領導者。而事實上，這亦將印尼置於一「金色牢籠」內，¹這是印度之於南亞，或是中國之於東南亞所無法享受的名目規範。

東協(ASEAN)反映了所有成員國對其國內共產動亂的關切，以及對外來影響力的拒斥，這是防止東南亞被外來強權所掌控，並排除於冷戰效果之外的一種有限度的嘗試。如此，東協拒斥了SEATO下的霸權區域主義，專注於其成員之間的衝突解決，並建立了一個雖不能完全避免但能嚇阻外力干預的區域空間。剛開始並未認真考慮經濟合作的問題，到了1970年代才逐步開始去做。這裡，我們必須提及日本的角色。

當東協於1967年八月成立時，日本政府即提議以東南亞經濟發展部長會議(Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of Southeast Asia, MCEDSEA)為一論壇，討論其與東協國家之間的雙邊關係。1950和1960年代的經濟合作強調援助和協助，這正符合日本的利益，尤其是有關經濟建設的發展。不過為了緩和東協與印支半島之間的緊張關係，日本也同樣需要提供援助予印支國家以維持雙方的良好關係(Narongchai and Apichart, 2003: 65)。1966年出現了一個新的區域組織——亞洲與太平洋理事會(Asia and Pacific Council, ASPAC)，該理事會建議由區域的中權國家——日本與澳洲在推動區域主義上扮演更積極的角色。不過ASPAC根本無法成形，主要是因為東協國家反應冷淡，他們有些(譬如印尼)認為ASPAC(日、澳為活躍的成員)就好像刻意為冷戰目標而設的西方企業一樣。澳洲的過度熱中以及日本在ASPAC內超強的經濟勢力，都是導致該組織崩潰的重要原因。這兩個經濟體雖號稱均同情與效忠於亞洲，但事實上在處理區域問題上都與美國或西歐較親近，使得ASPAC的鄰近氛圍顯得很不真實(British Embassy, 1968; 轉引自Acharya, 2014: 29)。另一份英國大使館的備忘則責怪日本「對新集團半吊子

¹ 金色牢籠(golden cage)是一種對印尼所處困境的隱喻，一方面它被承認為東協的實質領導者，另一方面它必須承諾自我設限，不得對較小鄰國施予脅迫。

式的陳述」，日本政府並體認到「東南亞因戰時的記憶仍對日本帶有敵意，同時也是因為日本在經濟上的獨霸之故」(British Embassy, 1973; 轉引自Acharya, 2014: 29)。所以，雖然ASPAC (1966)和東協(1967)的成立僅為一年之隔，但他們卻顯現了極端差異的規範型態，故當ASPAC在1975年即告終結，而東協則遠比它要長壽許多。日本後來轉而強調網絡式的區域主義，可能就是有感於由日本領導的跨政府區域組織是很難為大多數亞洲國家所接受吧！

這個時期顯得較有發展前景與較長遠影響者，應該就是太平洋共同體的理念，而這也正好與日本的恢復成為經濟強權相契合。在1960和1970年代，大多數提倡這個理念的是個別領導者(日本首相)與學者(像是小島清)。剛開始時，這些提議都是針對太平洋先進工業國家—日本、澳洲、美國與加拿大，不過鑒於合法性與可續性的重要，乃逐漸及於東協國家，後者並慢慢成為整個架構的中心。這種太平洋共同體的進展幾乎都不訴諸正式制度的建立，像是PECC和其他二軌論壇。²他們吸引了大量學者相互爭辯是要奉行開放與諮商區域主義，還是採取封閉與整合的型態，最後大家同意應採前者的做法。而當亞太區域的經濟連結更為提升之後，必須建立一正式組織的動機亦愈趨強烈，終於在1989年出現了亞太經濟合作(APEC)論壇組織。

區域強權一日、中的興起

日本此時在亞洲區域主義所扮演的角色已極突出，並值得特別關注。雖然一開始日本對東協並沒有那麼大的興趣(它較關注ASPAC和MCEDSEA)，但隨後它逐漸察覺東協的價值所在，最初是為了區域穩定，後來則是出於經濟目的。東協各會員國不只是日本工業發展所需的主要原料來源，而且是日本產品的市場，同時更重要的是，也是1985年日幣升值後快速興起以日本為中心的區域生產網絡之最後連結點。最初，日本在支持東協經濟發展方面主要倚賴官方發展援助，從1975年到1987年間，日本對外援助有65%到亞洲，其中東協所占比例為32%到44.7%不等(Narongchai and Apichart, 2003)。其後，日本在協助東協的經濟角色亦包含大幅的直接投資(FDI)，資本雄厚的日本企業在廣場協定後，於1988到1993年間對東協的FDI金額達到220億美元(1985年的廣場協定導致日圓的大幅升值)。依據若干估計，日本於1990到2000年期間有20%的淨對外直接投資是到東南亞，1990到1998年間的金額達到520億美元(Narongchai and Apichart, 2003)。

以上的討論顯示，不論美國或日本對亞洲給予多大的支助(美國是在軍事和經濟領域，日本則主要在經濟領域)，他們都無法獨自建立亞洲的區域體制，東協還是亞洲區域主義的主要平台。而亞洲區域主義在後冷戰時期亦經歷了若干重要的變化，東協在冷戰後首次於新加坡舉行的高峰會議，採納了新前景和新方向，也就是提升安全的合作、建立東協自由貿易區，和更廣泛的參與亞太多邊安全合作體系。1997到1998年的金融危機是亞洲區域主義的重要轉捩點，亞洲的區域體制包括APEC、東協區域論壇(ARF)和東協都必須採取有效的回應，包括重新界定東協做法(the ASEAN way)、放寬非干預原則，採行過去被忽視或避開的

² 非官方集會，政府官員通常以私人名義參加。

新合作方式。職是之故，東亞共同體的想法開始受到支持，APEC和ARF等較廣泛的亞太組織變得中看不重用。像是東協加三的機制，以至於東亞高峰會(EAS)等都是這個區域重新界定後的產物，只因為東亞認同似乎要比亞太認同更為自然與可行。

至於在萬隆會議時被部分人所期待的中國之領導角色，後來究竟如何發展呢？1990年代末中國的快速崛起，使得北京扮演領導者角色的可能性大增，不過很少人期待它將超越日本。然而，日本在金融危機後若干倡議(包括宮澤計畫)的功敗垂成，則又讓人興起中國將取代東協和日本而成為亞洲區域主義領導者的聯想。不論如何，中國還是不太可能被接受成為泛亞洲區域體制的領導者(上海合作組織不一樣)，這可從若干實例得到驗證。

譬如，中國希望將EAS的成員侷限於東協加三的國家，而因東協成員像是印尼和新加坡的堅持，陸續讓澳洲、紐西蘭和印度加入(2005年)，後來更讓美國和俄羅斯也加入(2010年)。結果東亞這個名詞便被賦予功能的意涵，而非地理的意涵，因為中國的崛起讓人擔憂它將掌控純東亞的區域集團。總之，我們可以確定的是，亞洲區域主義若缺了中國固然就沒有意義，不過若是被中國所獨霸則又是政治上不能被接受的。另一方面，雖然更多國家的加入給予EAS更大的能量以處理區域的安全議題(此為EAS的預設焦點)，但是隨著日本所提議的東亞共同體和澳洲所提議的亞太共同體被擱置取代之後，亦凸顯了日本和澳洲在主導建立區域體制方面，所遭遇的難題。

後記

我們還要附加一個令人失望的後記。在雙邊貿易協商成為熱門趨勢而APEC逐漸退色之際，它過去極力推動的太平洋多邊自由貿易區之典範，亦被美國主導的跨太平洋夥伴協定(TPP)所取代。在萬隆會議六十年後的今天，亞洲區域主義需要解決的，還是領導者的問題。歷經了幾次的危機，而今天則目睹了南海爭議的甚囂塵上，以東協為驅動者的亞洲區域體制，像是ARF和EAS，逐漸受到嚴厲的質疑。雖然是這麼說，但以東協為中心(ASEAN centrality)的原則又似乎不易被撼動，因為目前包括美國在內的其他國家都願意承認此原則。

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Bandung Revisited

At the time when the American Independence Declaration has been signed, Thomas Paine murmured complainingly in the *Common Sense*, “Freedom hath been hunted round the globe. Asia, and Africa, have long expelled her—Europe regards her like a stranger, and England hath given her warning to depart.”³ Political freedom and democracy had been nurtured as well as trampled around the world but, as he hoped, the United States would be a place different from the others. Nevertheless, he would never have imagined at that time that almost 180 years later, a summit conference in Bandung, Indonesia, supposedly gathering all major countries in Asia and Africa, was destined to expel western influences and to build a region of their own, a region where their vision of freedom will not be trampled.

There also emerged an exhilarating myth in the 1955 Bandung Conference wherein China and India would lead all Asian countries to build a model area of developing countries. Unfortunately, the myth has been dissipated quickly in the 1960s. For India, it has come into a wrong turning internally and worsened relations with Pakistan who, ironically, was used to be one of Colombo Powers and a co-sponsor of Bandung Conference. For China, it reneged very soon the vows of non-interference which is one of the Ten Principles (*Dasa Sila*) of Bandung Declaration. More importantly, the war between China and India had disappointed all other countries who had expected to be lead by these two countries. As for Japan, it has been trapped in historical memories of imperialist actions and dared not to raise any new initiative for regional cooperation.

At the same time, Southeast Asia was encountering serious splintering with constant conflict within each country as well as among them such as, especially, Sukarno’s heinous *konfrontasi* against the newly established Malaya Union. While the first trial by Malaysia to establish an area organization—the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) has failed because the biggest member of Southeast Asia—Indonesia has not been included, its second trial of establishing Maphilindo (Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia) to unite all Malay nations has also been a failure because of Sukarno’s denial of the legitimacy of Federation of Malaysia y way of military actions.

This paper will be based on the progress of Asia-Pacific area cooperation as stimulated by the Bandung Conference and to explore who should be the most appropriate leader(s) in the area. We will first expound on the emergence of the concept of “Asianness” and then discuss the rise and decline of nationalist regionalism and re-

³ Thomas Paine, “Common Sense (Thoughts on the Present State of American Affairs)” (<http://genius.com/Thomas-paine-common-sense-thoughts-on-the-present-state-of-american-affairs-annotated/>, accessed October 6, 2015).

gionalism within “great power orbit”. We will then reveal the pivotal of success in autonomous cooperation of the Southeast Asian area while the rise of regional powers—Japan and China has brought more variables into area cooperation. Finally, we pinpoint some expectations with a little bit of disappointment.

The Emergence of Asianness

The Bandung Conference was nominally an assembly of Asian and African countries, but in reality was primarily a conference of Asian countries. At the same time, the non-alignment movement as initiated by Indonesia has de facto started from the conference, which was aimed to get rid of colonial domination and to raise the level of development by mutual cooperation among them. The conference has basically culminated in some declaration of principles, with no agreement on any solid implementing measures and with an obvious political purpose rather than negotiating regional economic cooperation. However, the concept of “Asianness” implicit in it should not be ignored. Especially when viewed from the tempting establishment of ASA in 1962, although it is nominally an association of Southeast Asian countries, all initiators regarded themselves as part of a larger Asian culture, politics and economy.⁴ Furthermore, the establishment of Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in 1967), the Pacific Asia Forum on Trade and Development (PAFTAD) started from 1968, and subsequently the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) established in 1980 are all destined for a larger Asia as negotiating arena for cooperation.

The idea of Pacific Community has been transformed into the idea of Asia-Pacific (or Asia Pacific) primarily to involve ASEAN countries so as to assuage their fearing of being marginalized as well as to involve China in the near future. This development seemed, on one hand, to go back to preliminary purpose, particularly the one-sided wishes of Indonesia, of involving China into the group for discussing peaceful cooperation in larger Asia. However, on the other hand, it seemed to contradict the post-War plan of the United States. The U.S. was suspicious on China’s intensions in having forcefully interfered in the 1954 Geneva Accords concerning Indochina so that it expected Southeast Asia to replace China as main market and source of material supply for non-communist Japan which was prospering after the War. The U.S. expected Southeast Asia could play the role of dividing Japan from China and returning to pre-War bilateral economic relations so that China could be excluded from attempting to re-enter the area.⁵

At the time of 60th anniversary of Bandung Conference, there should be no doubt on

⁴ See, for example, Amitav Acharya, “Asia Is Not One,” *Journal of Asian Studies*, 69(4) (November 2010), pp. 1008-9.

⁵ Michael J. Montesanto, “Bandung 1955 and Washington’s Southeast,” in See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (eds.), *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), pp. 204-5.

the idea and fact that Southeast Asia is a specific area. Furthermore, from the point of view of today's world, this idea and fact is more meaningful than the idea of non-alignment or peaceful co-existence raised 60 years ago. At the same time, the "peaceful emergence" of China is also shaping international politics of Asia, which could be witnessed profoundly in the writings of James Lilley, former chairman of AIT and U.S. ambassador to China.⁶ However, I wonder how many people in the area can realize that the present-day intimate interactions between China and ASEAN could, in fact, be traced back to the Bandung Conference. On the other hand, the recognized legacy of Bandung Conference is neither the consolidation between Asian and African countries (or even the non-alignment movement), nor the paranoid as expressed by John Dulles, former Secretary of State of the U.S., but rather the maneuvering of Southeast Asia and post-War United States. This is also why Barak Obama, in attending the 2014 APEC meeting in China, has said, "We are not finished yet. The Indispensable Nation must dominate everywhere. We departed when the Vietnamese humiliated us and drove us from the neighborhood. But we are back. We are pivoting."⁷

The Rise and Decline of Nationalist Regionalism and Regionalism within "Great Power Orbit"

As a matter of fact, viewed from the point of area cooperation, the U.S. has never left Asia, so that there is no such thing as "back". Just as William Henderson wrote in 1963, "... it is only in Southeast Asia where cooperative patterns have begun to develop and where there is an increasing pace of 'regional activity'."⁸ The South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), originated from the U.S. Trumanism, has failed to recruit any Southeast Asian countries other than the Philippines and Thailand because of the non-aligning influence emanating from the Bandung Conference. And the appearance of Chinese representatives in the Conference (led by Chou En-lai) also had given a hard striking at U.S. planning for the region. U.S. involvement in the second Indochinese conflict (the Vietnam War) was meant to perpetuate its post-1949 Southeast Asia policy. But the contact between China and Southeast Asia in Bandung as well as the failure in SEATO's expansion had increasingly pushed the mind of the U.S. away from Southeast Asia.

If it is said that Bandung Conference has resulted in a setback in American planning for Southeast Asia, then it seems only in terms of political or security, but not eco-

⁶ See, for example, James Lilley, *China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

⁷ John V. Walsh, "Obama's Pivot to Asia: Can China Contain America?" GlobalResearch, 16 November, 2014 (<http://www.globalresearch.ca/obamas-pivot-to-asia-can-china-contain-america/5414574>).

⁸ William Henderson, ed., *Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963), p. 92.

conomic, aspect. Although the Bandung Conference has been popularly regarded as an attempt to transcend the ideology of decolonization and explore the possibility of building new world order, there were, however, some achievement in economic (and energy) cooperation. Of course, the 1955 Bandung Conference, as well as the previous Asian Relations Conferences in 1947 and 1949 sponsored by India, occurred at the time when economic nationalism was in ascendancy. This is different from economic liberalism of the developed countries that emphasizes trade opening. The regionalisms developed in this period could be called regionalisms within “great power orbit”.⁹ This was represented first in the effort of the U.S., backed by the United Kingdom (UK), to create a regional collective defense organization. Established in 1954, the SEATO was geared to meet the perceived threat of subversion from the PRC. It also envisaged economic assistance to vulnerable countries.

Nevertheless, both of the above-mentioned regionalisms were not able to take root in Asia, which means that there was no effective regional organization. India and leaders of the Bandung Conference have legitimate rights to represent the region, but they all lack the ability to organize effective institutions. On the other hand, the great powers behind SEATO definitely possess capabilities, but they do not have legitimate rights to represent the region. Specifically, India, as leader of the Asian Relations Conferences, was able to provide substantive assistance to Indonesia’s nationalist movement against the Netherlands, but decided not to provide any assistance to Ho Chi Minh, politics being part of the reason. Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister at that time, clearly realized that Indian military involvement in many wars in Asia and other areas during British colonial period have irritated so many countries that it would not want to get involved into Indochina, making political situation more complicated. Therefore, it was very cautious on substantial assistance toward Asian nationalist movement. On the other hand, when India’s territory had been divided after centuries of colonial rules and it was working hard to build economic foundations, there were actually not many usable resources.

A much more serious barrier to pan-Asia regionalism is the suspicion of smaller countries toward India and China. One statement by a Burmese participant returning from the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi is revealing: “It was terrible to be ruled by a Western power, but it was even more so to be ruled by an Asian power.”¹⁰ At the Bandung Conference, Nehru’s role in supporting China’s communist government, along with the arrogant manner in which Nehru treated hosts Indonesia

⁹ Amitav Acharya, “Foundations of Collective Action in Asia: Theory and Practice of Regional Cooperation,” Chap. 2 in G. Capannelli and M. Kawai (eds.), *The Political Economy of Asian Regionalism* (Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2014), p. 25.

¹⁰ William Henderson, “The Development of Regionalism in Southeast Asia,” *International Organization*, 9(4), (November 1955), pp. 463-76.

and other delegates, created a misgivings on the part of many other countries about Indian leadership. The economic outcome of the Bandung Conference included “an increased readiness to undertake development, by self-help and mutual aid, in the economic field.”¹¹ There were calls for collective action to stabilize “prices of, and demand for, primary commodities,” and for concerted action “to induce the shipping companies to adopt a more reasonable attitude”, “for more raw materials to be processed before export”, “for the encouragement of the establishment of national and regional banks and insurance companies,” “for the exchange of information on matters relating to oil,” and “for consultations between the Bandoeng countries before the international meetings.”¹² These proposals, especially for exchange of information on oil prices, might have foreshadowed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel, and the demand for collective bargaining to raise commodity prices, was something ASEAN would pursue later. Moreover, neither India nor the PRC were able to offer the kind of resources to start a regional economic arrangement comparable to the British Commonwealth sponsored Colombo Plan, and Japan, despite taking an active interest on economic issues at Bandung, was not in a political position to provide any leadership at this stage.

On the other hand, except the U.S. failure in SEATO, the blueprint for a Southeast Asia Development Association (SEADA) by the Johnson administration from the mid-1960s had revealed the U.S. desire “to dramatize the seriousness of our long-term commitment to Asian development in forms which enlarge the role of Asian leadership and which strengthen Asian unity.”¹³ Overall, U.S. officials estimated that supporting such a regional grouping would require “a figure of US\$6.4 billion for a 10 year period would represent a 20% increase over present levels.” If military aid was included, the figure would have been US\$ 8 billion over 10 years.¹⁴

The Forming of Autonomous Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia

But the SEADA idea failed to take off, despite the U.S. willingness to commit substan-

¹¹ J. E. Cable, “Chancery Singapore, to South East Asia Department, Foreign Office, London,” *Asian-African Conference*, 7 May 1955, D2231/345, FO 371/116984, TNA, PRO (Set 5); cited in Acharya, “Foundations of Collective Action in Asia,” p. 25.

¹² A. G. Gilchrist, “Office of the Commissioner-General for the UK Singapore, to F. S. Tomlinson. Foreign Office, London,” *The Economic Recommendations of the Bandung Conference*, 7 June 1955, D2231/370D, FO 371/116986, TNA, PRO; cited in Acharya, “Foundations of Collective Action in Asia,” pp. 25-26.

¹³ U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum from the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” Washington, March 30, 1965, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs*, Document 56 (2000) (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v27/d56>).

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum from the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy).”

tial resources. Part of the reason had to do with the distraction and difficulties caused by the ongoing war in Vietnam, which proved enormously costly for the Johnson administration both in economic and domestic political terms, and made it difficult to mobilize support and resources. But there is little evidence that Southeast Asian countries endorsed the idea with any degree of enthusiasm. Instead, by this time, there had emerged indigenous interest and approaches to regionalism in Southeast Asia, represented by the ASA in 1960 and Maphilindo in 1963. Although both were short-lived, these tentative efforts were subsumed by the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967—a formal intergovernmental organization. ASEAN gave Indonesia the legitimacy, based on an implicit normative bargain whereby Indonesia (under the new regime of Suharto) undertook a policy of restraint (nonintervention and nonaggression) towards its smaller neighbors (such as Malaysia and Singapore), while its neighbors accepted Indonesia's legitimacy as a regional elder, if not leader per se. In effect, this put Indonesia into a “golden cage”,¹⁵ a normative formula that neither India in relation to South Asia nor the PRC in relation to Southeast Asia, was able to enjoy.

ASEAN reflected a shared concern with regime security against communist insurgencies in all its member states, as well as a rejection of outside influence and meddling in Southeast Asian affairs, a limited attempt to prevent Southeast Asia being dominated by outside powers and insulate it from the effects of the Cold War. As such, ASEAN repudiated the SEATO approach to hegemonic regionalism, and focused on conflict resolution among its members, as well as creating a regional space where great power intervention might be discouraged, if not entirely avoided. Economic cooperation was not seriously considered at the beginning, but the first tentative steps would be taken in the 1970s. Here, we have to talk about the role of Japan. When ASEAN came into being in August 1967, Japan proposed to use the Ministerial Conference on Economic Development in Southeast Asia (MCSDEA)—started in 1966—to discuss its relations with ASEAN countries. Economic cooperation in the 1950s and 1960s emphasized aid and assistance, this was consistent with Japan's interests, especially those related to development of economic construction. But to assuage the tensions between ASEAN and Indochina, Japan also needed to provide aid to Indochinese countries to sustain good bilateral relations.¹⁶ There appeared a new regional organization—Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), which suggested that

¹⁵ “Golden cage” is a metaphor to describe Indonesia's predicament in being recognized as the de facto leader of ASEAN in exchange for not accepting a commitment to exercise restraint toward its smaller neighbors and not to threaten or coerce them.

¹⁶ Narongchai Akrasanee and Apichart Prasert, “The Evolution of ASEAN-Japan Economic Cooperation,” in Japan Center for International Exchange, ed., *ASEAN-Japan Cooperation: A Foundation for East Asian Community* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2003), p. 65.

the area's mid-powers—Japan and Australia should play more active roles in promoting regionalism. But it never took off, thanks to lukewarm response from the ASEAN members, some of which, like Indonesia, saw ASPAC (in which Australia and Japan were active members) as a Western enterprise geared to their Cold War agenda. Excessive Australian zeal and Japan's disproportionate economic power within ASPAC were two important reasons that might produce the "collapse" of the grouping. The atmosphere surrounding ASPAC was "unreal" due to the presence of these two countries which, though professing Asian sympathies and loyalties, are in fact much more closer to the U.S. or to Western Europe in their way of looking at the area's problems.¹⁷ It is noteworthy that while ASPAC (1966) and ASEAN (1967) were set up within a year of each other, they reflected very different normative settings, and ASEAN was to outlive ASPAC that folded in 1975. Japan's subsequent emphasis on network-style regionalism might have been the result of its realization that an inter-governmental regional organization led by Japan would not be acceptable to most Asians.

A more promising development with a longer-lasting impact during this period was the emergence of the Pacific Community idea. This coincided with Japan's reemergence as an economic powerhouse. Much of it was the result of proposals by individual leaders (Japanese prime ministers) and scholars (such as Kiyoshi Kojima) in the 1960s and 1970s. In the beginning these proposals were confined to the advanced industrial countries of the Pacific—Japan, Australia, the U.S., and Canada—but concern about legitimacy and viability saw the gradual extension to include the ASEAN countries, which came to feature more centrally in these frameworks. These Pacific Community movement progressed almost exclusively without formal institution building, through discussions and elaborations within epistemic communities—such as the PECC—and other Track-II fora.¹⁸ They attracted a great deal of academic debate over the merits of open and consultative regionalism, versus closed and integrative type, before settling decisively in favor the former. As economic linkages in Asia and the Pacific grew, there was growing momentum toward the establishment of a formal regional organization which occurred with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989.

The Rise of Regional Powers—Japan and China

Japan's role in Asian regionalism at this stage came to the fore and deserves special notice. Although initially uninterested in ASEAN (it focused more on ASPAC and MCSDSEA) Japan came to value ASEAN as a vehicle initially for regional stability and

¹⁷ British Embassy in Jakarta to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, *A.S.E.A.N. Membership and A.S.E.A.N. A.S.P.A.C. Relations*, 26 August 1968, FCO 15/23, TNA; cited in Acharya, "Foundations of Collective Action in Asia," p. 29.

¹⁸ Nonofficial meetings in which government officials may participate in their private capacity.

subsequently for its economic objectives. Not only were ASEAN members a source of raw materials for Japan's industrialization, but also a market for Japanese products and more importantly, as a final link in the Japan-centered regional production network, that rapidly emerged following the 1985 revaluation of the yen. Initially, Japan's economic role in support of ASEAN took the form of official development assistance. Between 1975 and 1987, 65% of Japan's foreign aid went to Asia, with ASEAN's share ranging from 32 to 44.7%.¹⁹ Later, Japan's economic role in support of ASEAN also involved massive foreign direct investment (FDI). As capital-rich Japanese companies headed southwards in the post Plaza Accord period, Japan's FDI in ASEAN from 1988 to 1993 amounted to US\$22 billion (The Plaza Accord of 1985 resulted in an upward valuation of the yen). According to some estimates, from 1990 to 2000, Japan had invested 20% of all net foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia, a figure that was as much as US\$ 52 billion from 1990 to 1998.²⁰

The foregoing discussion shows that neither the U.S. nor Japan, despite their strong support for regional collective action in Asia (U.S. in the military and economic arena, Japan mainly in the economic arena), could create and shape a regional institution on their own. Asian regionalism went through some major changes in the post-Cold War period. ASEAN at its first post-Cold War summit in Singapore adopted a new vision and direction, which would mean increasing security cooperation, an ASEAN Free Trade Area, and greater participation in Asia-Pacific multilateral security cooperation. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 was a turning point in Asian regionalism. In response to the crisis, and criticism of the failure of existing Asian regional institutions, including APEC, ARF, and ASEAN to come up with an effective response, pressures grew for redefining the ASEAN way, diluting the principle of non-interference, engaging in new forms of cooperation that had been neglected or avoided in the past (including financial cooperation). As a result, the idea of an East Asian community drew support, as broader Asia Pacific regroupings such as APEC and ARF looked ineffectual. The ASEAN+3 mechanism and eventually the East Asia Summit (EAS) were the outcome of this process of regional redefinition, carried out ostensibly because an East Asia identity seemed more natural and attainable than an Asia-Pacific identity.

What about the leadership role China, who was highly expected by some in the Bandung Conference, should play? By the late 1990s, the PRC's spectacular rise has created the possibility of Beijing assuming a leadership role in regional institutions, although few expected it to supplant Japan. During the Asian financial crisis, several Japan's crisis-induced proposals (such as the New Miyazawa Initiative) fell through

¹⁹ Narongchai and Apichart, "The Evolution of ASEAN-Japan Economic Cooperation."

²⁰ Narongchai and Apichart, "The Evolution of ASEAN-Japan Economic Cooperation."

(some due to U.S. pressure), the PRC could be seen as an alternative to Japanese and ASEAN leadership of Asian regionalism. But the PRC was not acceptable as a leader of pan-Asian regional institutions (the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a smaller subregional body, is different), as subsequent events have shown.

The PRC's desire to keep the membership of the East Asia Summit to the ASEAN+3 countries has been frustrated with the inclusion—at the insistence of ASEAN members such as Indonesia and Singapore—first of Australia, New Zealand, and India when the EAS first convened in 2005, and with the admission of the U.S. and the Russian Federation in 2010. In the end East Asia would itself be given a functional as opposed to geographic meaning, as the rise of the PRC created concerns of a PRC takeover of strictly East Asian regional groupings. What is clear is that while Asian regionalism would be meaningless without participation from the PRC, they would not be politically acceptable with PRC dominance. While the participation of these countries gives the EAS more weight in dealing with regional security issues—the presumed focus of EAS—the dream of an East Asian Community, mimicking the European Union (EU), once proposed by Japan as a counter to the idea of a more comprehensive Asia Pacific Community proposed by Australia in 2008 has been displaced. The failure of the Japanese and Australian initiatives also underscores the problems of legitimacy that Japan and Australia face, in regional institution building.

Concluding Remarks

We want to add a somewhat frustrating remark. Recently when bilateral trade agreement negotiations are in the upward trend and APEC seems increasingly fade away, the model of Pacific multilateral trade agreement it has actively promoted is now replaced by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as strongly backed up by the United States. Sixty years after the Bandung Conference, a very important problem needed to be solved in today's Asian regionalism is that of leadership. While the area has experienced quite a few crises and is witnessing rising turmoil in South China Sea, Asian regional institutions driven by ASEAN, such as ARF and EAS, are facing increasingly more suspicions. Nevertheless, it seems that the idea of ASEAN centrality will unshakably be sustained in the near future as other countries, including the U.S., are all willing to abide by it.