Title: Border Permeability and the State in Southeast Asia: Contraband and Regional Security.
Subject(s): ASIA, Southeastern -- Boundaries; POLITICAL science -- Asia, Southeastern
Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs, Aug2001, Vol. 23 Issue 2, p254, 21p
Author(s): Tagliacozzo, Eric
Abstract:
Focuses on border permeability and the government in Southeast Asia. Regulation of international flow of commodities for financial, territorial and security reasons; Analysis on the connecting mechanisms between ASEAN frontier regions; Accounts on issues related to border agreements.
BORDER PERMEABILITY AND THE STATE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: CONTRABAND AND REGIONAL SECURITY
In Southeast Asia, governments have increasingly tried to regulate international flows of commodities for financial, territorial, and security reasons. This article examines the relationship between borders and contraband in this arena, arguing that their interrelationship has become an important -- and understudied -- part of the regional security mosaic. The article analyses some of the connecting mechanisms between ASEAN frontier regions, and then explores how these mechanisms are being undermined by a range of countervailing forces. Here, the focus is on two contraband lines in particular: the transit of wildlife, and the passage of a diverse spectrum of "consumer goods". The widening transit of such commodities presents special challenges to regional security, which are likely to plague local regimes in the foreseeable future.
The security agenda in Southeast Asia has undergone significant broadening in recent decades. Arms races, the desired role of Japan, and conflict in the South China Sea have been joined of late by cyber warfare, theatre missile defence, and dialogues on Myanmar, among other pressing issues. Scholars have looked at ASEAN's particular dynamics as a security grouping, and have even begun asking whether its characteristics and mechanics might be emulated in other parts of the world.[1] Some of these reappraisals have been part and parcel of a larger shift in the cadence of security studies, not just in Southeast Asia, but on the international stage as well.[2] Yet, there is a growing sense in the literature that Southeast Asia's security equation is especially complex, as states in this region evince highly-complicated interrelationships, governed by a broad spectrum of thorny issues. This has been true at least since the 1960s, but the swirling of these forces seems only to have gathered momentum in the last two decades.
This article suggests that two concepts -- border permeability and illegal trade -- should have a higher profile within this widening security agenda. The examination of international frontiers in the global political economy has become a fertile field of study in recent years. Ironically, this has happened at the same time that borders are becoming less important, in terms of their restrictive capabilities.[3] Scholars have approached frontiers as part of a regional security context in various ways. Some of the best work have been done in a comparative vein, while the observations and methodologies of anthropologists on the ground have also been very instructive.[4] The transit of illegal trade through borders has also received increasing attention of late, as theorists and planners alike seek to explain how porous boundaries affect the relationships between neighbouring states.[5] Southeast Asia, with its ten sovereign nations, differing systems of government, and myriad border populations, presents an interesting case-study for these dynamics. More than most global arenas, frontiers and illicit commerce here play a fundamental part in the region's security calculus.
This article examines these boundaries and flows on a systemic, pan-regional basis. An initial attempt is made to situate Southeast Asia's frontiers in a regional context, as border agreements, surveillance, and organized crime are related to government security concerns. The remainder of the article then delves into two particular contraband lines as windows into these dynamics: the trade in natural resources or biota (including flora and fauna), and the illicit commerce in "consumer goods". Both are shown to be enterprises on a huge scale, which have interpenetrated the "normal" economic flows of the region in a wide variety of ways. The importance of these shadow circuits on commodities cannot be overstated. Money to national treasuries is lost, and ends up in the pockets of actors whose aims are often inimical to the state. Alternative power sources are built, and are then padded with this income for the future. On Southeast Asia's frontiers, contests for resources lead to disputes over territory, sometimes positioning area regimes as fierce, opposing claimants. The threats to regional security span the financial, territorial, and diplomatic. This article attempts to map some of these agreements and transgressions, as well as important structural impediments and flows, from an overall security perspective. Contrary to existing models of co-operation based on ASEAN's coamity, it argues that increased border permeability and contraband present serious and potentially enduring problems to security in the region.
Southeast Asia has a relatively open environment for trade, which has been a hallmark of the region for many centuries. Yet, because the modern territorial conception of borders was alien to this part of the world and was introduced only forcibly by Europeans, it should not surprise anyone that goods continue to flow across these demarcations, often without the blessing of the state.[6] Globalization, regional economic blocs, and the growth of subregional economic development "triangles" have only accelerated this trend in recent years, providing new avenues and impetus to a range of traders (acting "legally" and "illegally") to move their cargoes across national boundaries. The establishment of localized, multi-country growth areas has particularly aided this process, with compilations such as the BIMP-EAGA development triangle (centred around the Sulu Sea between Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) proving especially profitable, and problematic in this sense.[7]
Border agreements and border re-arrangements have been most actively pursued in mainland Southeast Asia in recent years. Bertil Lintner has summarized the many border conventions of this area in a study published in 1991. These negotiations have continued unabated until today, as regional governments attempted to legislate border co-operation for both economic and security rationales. Thailand, located centrally upon the mainland, has been a locus for these deliberations: the country's borders stretch far from the capital, and are extremely porous to international trade. The official value of Thailand's border trade in 1996 was over 61 billion baht; the unofficial tallies (due to smuggling) would be far higher. Laos has recently been discussing better border co-operation with Myanmar and China, while the last country has been looking to improving its border communications with all of its Southeast Asian neighbours, especially Vietnam. A central rationale behind all these renewed contacts and discussions has been the problem of contraband, as has been stated in many of these nations' joint communiques.[8]
Increasing border dialogues and trade flows have given rise to a host of new infrastructural projects designed to better connect borders in the region. In the above-mentioned BIMP-EAGA development sphere, expanded postal routes now link northern Indonesia and the southern Philippines. A second road link has also recently been added between Malaysia and Singapore; already, the volume of traffic crossing the original link (a causeway) was too great for customs officials on either side to check all transiting vehicles for contraband. Plans have been announced for the construction of a huge bridge connecting Malaysia and Indonesia across the Strait of Malacca as well. Although the specific location of the structure's endpoints has not yet been determined, the agreement calls for railway, gas pipes, and power cables on the bridge, as well as a main connecting section of road.[9] On the mainland, a large immigration plaza has been built on the border between Thailand and Malaysia; this is in addition to other projects between Thailand and its neighbours, including the "Friendship Bridge" near Vientiane, and the planned third Mekong bridge stretching across to Savannakhet (both in Laos].[10]
The enormous opening of border facilities and connections has come at a price, however. Alongside increased legitimate border trade revenues have also flowed goods and problems of another kind. Contraband and security, as it relates to border traffic generally, have become major issues now in Southeast Asia's geopolitics. This can be seen from many different vantage points. China's recent agreement with Myanmar, which allows the former the use of the Irrawaddy River as a trade outlet to the Indian Ocean, has caused a wave of worry in Southeast Asian capitals. The move has been seen as a serious breach of geostrategic balance in the region, both in the cross-border opportunities it affords Chinese narcotics traffickers, and through possible designs by the Chinese navy.[11] On the Mekong, increased border trade several years ago led to an international incident between Thailand and Laos, when Thai border police crossed into Lao territory and threatened a convoy of cargo boats they suspected of smuggling.[12] In Indonesia, where increased openness to border trade manifests itself primarily in the maritime realm, the effects of the new openness have been felt as well. More than ten thousand ships were caught illegally docking in Indonesian waters in 1996, leading to a wave of self-reflection by the Indonesian navy on how secure the country's coasts really were. As if to underline the point, a small Indonesian ship recently drifted 3,000 kilometres off-course (and half-way through the island-nation] before it was finally discovered in distress by the U.S. coast guard in Micronesia.[13]
The new openness of borders in the region has also spurred Southeast Asian governments into taking concrete measures to stem the effects of smuggling that are part of the boundary liberalization process. These efforts have manifested themselves in different forms. One of the ways has been to encourage the co-operation of law enforcement agencies across frontiers: the police forces of Singapore and Malaysia have been particularly adept at this, while Vietnam and Cambodia have also signed a similar accord.[14] Another way has been to map out coasts and terrain with a greater degree of efficiency, both by increasing interdiction forces in these areas and by producing more accurate charts of difficult terrain. The Philippines has added more ships, and Malaysia more coastal radar stations along these lines, while Laos is using the Global Positioning System (GPS) to better map its borders. Indonesia is closing down old markets and opening new ones along the frontier with Papua New Guinea, trying to influence the terms of trade more directly.[15]
Finally, better "tagging" is being attempted on people who frequently cross borders, so that a more watchful eye may be kept on their activities. Indonesia now has different types of passports to deter its citizens from travelling abroad illegally (sometimes under the guise of undertaking the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca), while Kuala Lumpur has introduced electronic security features into Malaysian passports to prevent forgeries. Laos has revamped its own border-crossing regulations with Thailand.[16] It is hoped that these steps taken by the governments in the region will make the increasing porosity of Southeast Asia's boundaries profitable to national exchequers, while limiting the abilities of citizens who may wish to take advantage of the new openness in "illegal" ways.
There are good reasons to suppose, however, that these counter-measures against the rising tide of smuggling in Southeast Asia will only be partially effective. One of the main reasons for this conclusion is that corruption, as in many other parts of the world, is rampant. Low civil service salaries and widespread cultural norms that wink at official graft make fighting corruption an uphill battle. Another strong hindrance to Southeast Asian states being able to seriously impede the flow of contraband, at least in the short-term, is the long reach of organized crime in the area. Many of these syndicates are indigenous. Others are arms of much larger networks, which now operate on a global scale. The range of both of these phenomena, corruption and organized crime, can be seen very clearly in counterfeiting, money-laundering, and gun-running, among other activities.[17]
Corruption may be the most serious single impediment in this equation. Indonesia has long had a reputation as one of the most indulgent nations in this regard; in 1995-96 the government amassed statistics of over 18,000 cases, costing the nation almost 900 billion rupiah. Five years later, in 2000-2001, Indonesia was again named as one of the "most corrupt" countries in the region, equal only to Vietnam in this respect, at least according to a survey of business executives.[18] Indonesia is not the only locus for these activities, however. For example, those who stand accused in the region on various charges of narcotics trafficking include Cambodia's richest businessman, opposition Members of Parliament in Thailand, and a senator from the Philippines. Even in squeaky-clean Singapore, policemen have been caught holding contraband materials which flaunt the island's strict bans on smuggling. In 1997, one officer was charged with possessing 1,200 pornographic video cassettes, found during a raid in his quarters.[19]
The reach and influence of organized crime in Southeast Asia has hardly helped to ameliorate the situation. Open borders and widening trade opportunities have been nothing but a boon to the corps of highly-organized gangs of smugglers in the region. Cambodia, in particular, owing to the chaos and instability that has reigned there for much of the last few decades, has become a safe haven for Asian crime gangs. International law enforcement agents have characterized the kingdom as a known "sanctuary" for these criminals, who can be Cambodian, Vietnamese, Thai, or ethnic Chinese. But Cambodia is only the most serious example. Organized crime is on the rise in the rest of the region as well, aided [often] by cutbacks in government funding to law enforcement agencies because of Asia's economic downturn. The syndicates, meanwhile, have become more advanced. An Australian Federal Police report described them thus: "[Asian] organized crime has become more sophisticated, mobile, and global, and its structures often reflect those of transitional corporations with access to the latest technologies."[20]
This increasing technical aptitude on the part of smugglers has been put to uso very quickly. One still reads about small-time operators being caught passing counterfeit U.S. dollar bills in Singapore and Cambodia, but larger operations -- as with the three plants outside Pyongyang, North Korea, which have been making U.S. "supernotes" and then passing them into circulation in Southeast Asia -- are now coming to light.[21] Money-laundering, the smuggling and then cleansing of "dirty" money into "clean", is also taking place on a large scale in Asia. The Secretary-General of Interpol has put tho yearly figure on these sorts of transactions at US$500 billion, a significant proportion of which transits through Asia.[22] Finally, arms merchants, perhaps the richest and most "high-end" of the international smugglers because of the nature of the contraband in which they traffic, are also deeply implicated in Southeast Asia's contemporary smuggling scene. Two hundred automatic rifles were found in a warehouse near Pochentong International Airport in Cambodia in 1997, while seizures of ammonium nitrate and fully-assembled bombs have made headlines in Indonesia.[23] The Worldwatch Institute estimates that there are now enough small arms in global circulation to arm every twelfth person on the planet.
Many of these guns are in constant motion along the Thai-Myanmar frontier. More than perhaps any other broadly-construed "space" in Southeast Asia, this frontier is a microcosm of how border-permeability, smuggled "commodities", and states interact to challenge regional security. A good portion of this challenge has, indeed, come from freely-circulating arms, which cross the border in large quantities. Karen guerrillas, fighting a decades-long ethnic insurgency against Yangon, are one of the groups implicated in these movements, as they ferry munitions back and forth across the frontier in order to be able to fight. Yet, they are by no means the only actors doing so. Several other border peoples, most notably the Shan State Army [SSA], have also been trafficking in military hardware, first to fight Yangon, and lately to fight other, upland competitors. More guns cross the Thai-Myanmar frontier every day than perhaps any other border on the planet; the only other region which is remotely comparable is the boundary region between Colombia and northern Peru.[24]
This comparison to South America is not accidental, for the other commodity in constant motion in both of these arenas is narcotics. As with the transit of cocaine in Latin America, opium (and its derivative, heroin) has been an integral part of ASEAN's security balance as well. Both the Yangon military and many of the region's upland peoples have made huge amounts of money from this trade, both before and after the 1996 "retirement" of drug kingpin, Khun Sa, from the business. Though there have been protestations to the contrary for a long time, narcotics (traditionally opium, but now methamphetamines as well) still fund much of the insurgency and counter-insurgency on this frontier today. The smuggling of migrants, forced labourers, and women for prostitution also keeps these borders fluid, vague, and difficult to define. These are some of the "glamour items" of Southeast Asian contraband, but they are by no means the only commodities affecting regional security.[25] When all of these factors are taken together, however, it is not hard to see why the transit of contraband across these international frontiers poses one of the largest transnational security dilemmas in the region today.
Widening trade contacts, increased border permeability, and the lingering power of corruption and organized crime all affect the security equation of the ASEAN states. The remainder of this article will examine two broad contraband trades -- natural resources and consumer goods -- to see what their scope and dynamics reveal about non-traditional security concerns such as smuggling in the region. We can begin with a subset of the trade in natural resources: the illegal transit of Southeast Asia's wildlife. This subject achieved cause celebre status in 2001 largely because of the efforts of the organization TRAFFIC -- the group has been very effective in publicizing its conservation agenda through many media outlets. The U.S. Department of Fish and Wildlife puts the global figure of this trade at approximately US$30 billion per annum, with Southeast Asia as one of the hotspots of the commerce, because of its incredible biodiversity.[26] The inventory on smuggled wildlife in the region covers a broad spectrum of goods, from mammals and an assortment of terrestrial animals to plants and the harvest of the sea.
Large animals, both indigenous to Southeast Asia and foreign (but prized in the region for various reasons) make up a large percentage of these illegal cargoes. Tigers are endemic to various parts of Southeast Asia but are now being hunted to near-extinction by poachers: conservation groups in north Sumatra have recommended that the estimate for the number of wild tigers there be downgraded from 800 to 500, while only 100-200 Indochinese tigers are assumed to survive in Cambodia.[27] Smaller animals, easily hidden and transported but worth no less than their larger cousins on the open market, are also being sold. More than half of Laos' national biodiversity conservation areas are on its borders, which has not helped to protect species like the pangolin, which is illegally exported for the value of its scales. A Gray's monitor lizard from Indonesia can fetch up to US$20,000 when trafficked, while Black Palm cockatoos fetch nearly that much, and Birdwing butterflies (the latter two also from Indonesia) US$2,500 per pair. Rare turtles are especially prized: the more uncommon species show up on Thai airliners, in Jakarta markets, and even in Singapore specialty stores, all to be used in Chinese medicinal products.[28]
The reach of the international contraband trade in wildlife has also seeped into Southeast Asia's plant dominions. Part of this trend is based on the very modern phenomenon of drug companies and botanists looking for rare plants and their potential medicinal values. The copyright on the use of certain biota can generate millions of dollars in pharmaceutical profits, if the medicines are eventually sold worldwide. A scandal in Malaysia, where Japanese (and other) botanists were found to be stealing rare plants from Endau Rompin Nature Park in the southern state of Johor, and a similar case in the Philippines, has brought these "scientific smuggling expeditions" to the attention of the world. Yet, the vast majority of pilfered forest resources have little to do with the high-tech world of drug-patenting in the industrialized countries, and more to do with the sale of profitable forest products by needy peasants. The collection of certain biota, even if rare or protected, can mean the difference between eating and not eating during a particularly bad harvest season, if the biota can be facilitated to market. It is not surprising, therefore, that Thai villagers are sometimes killed when they illegally cross the Myanmar border in search of such products, or that eaglewood trees (once common in Vietnam, but now close to extinction) are still illicitly stripped and sold by Vietnamese villagers.[29]
A final wildlife-sourcing station that offers opportunities for smugglers is the sea. Southeast Asia's warm, shallow waters are vast, difficult to patrol, and possess great wealth in fish and other resources. The combination of these three factors allows contrabanders a tempting field for potential profit and activity in the region. The main prize here is the large cargo of fish and other edible sea creatures which fetch predictable prices at market; fishing boats from various ASEAN states, and other countries just outside the grouping, often sail into each other's waters and illegally smuggle their catches abroad. On the Thai-Cambodian frontier, this sort of contrabanding has been the subject of continual disputes: Thai and Cambodian coastal patrols have seized each other's boats as well as fishing nets and catches over such incidents. Philippine boats have been consistently caught fishing illegally in eastern Indonesia, while the number of detained Chinese fishermen in the same waters has reached up to three hundred in a single month's seizures alone.[30] Capturing and then carting off wildlife of this sort provides avenues of profit for a wide scope of contrabanders, from fishermen and wholesalers to dishonest coastguards and customs agents in host-country waters.
One sort of biota is smuggled more frequently, and on a greater scale than all other resources from the natural environment: timber. Although the trade in trafficked gems and metals in Southeast Asia may, perhaps, rival timber smuggling in terms of absolute cash value, the sheer scope of illegal logging and its transit across national boundaries is by far the largest nature-based smuggling phenomenon present in the region. The illicit movement of timber takes place on a small, opportunistic basis in many parts of Southeast Asia; Taiwanese ships periodically move logs out of the Philippines, for example, and smugglers have denuded parts of the cordillera running north through Vietnam.[31] These actions pale in comparison, however, with the three main sites of timber extraction and its subsequent illegal transit: Cambodia, the Thai-Myanmar border, and the forest frontier on the island of Borneo (between Malaysia and Indonesia).
Measured only by sheer rapacity, Cambodia's situation may be the worst of these three areas. The constant civil turmoil -- first between the Khmer Rouge and the government, and then between players in the government itself -- has encouraged an atmosphere where logs fund political power bases, and often, survival itself. Government factions, insurgents, criminals and wealthy business concerns all sell as much timber as they can, often flouting national laws. An export ban on logs was passed on 31 December 1996, but has been almost universally ignored since that date.
The Deputy Director of Forestry in Cambodia has said that illegal logging remains rampant in the provinces of Kampong Thom, Preah Vihear, Stung Treng, Kratie, Stem Reap, Ratanakiri, and Banteay Meanchey. Logging companies pay villagers bribes to keep them from reporting, and this has often (though not always) worked; yet, it seems hardly necessary when smugglers are armed. In 1997, authorities seized a boat heading down the Mekong with a cargo of logs, the guards of which were wearing police uniforms and touting AK-47s and several B-40 rocket launchers.[32] The traffickers also move by sea: the Thai province of Trat is a notorious site for illegal log distribution, but Phnom Penh is hardpressed to take severe measures to solve the problem, as one government minister has complained that "the sea is full of men with guns". The border with Vietnam is little different. A foreigner who witnessed a huge illegal transit operation in December 1996 speculated that 2,300 truckloads of timber crossed the frontier: "I couldn't count all the trucks. They came day and night for (the span of) one month."[33] Because the Cambodian elite and military are deeply involved with logging in Cambodia, it is very difficult for international watchdog groups to enforce their warnings of impending and widespread ecological damage to the country. The Swiss-based Societe Generale de Surveillance (SGS), in fact, terminated its own timber monitoring contract in Cambodia because its agents were at risk in such a "Wild West" arena.
The Thai-Myanmar frontier has been an equally lawless domain for a long time, partly because of the number and positioning of feuding parties over resources, many of whom traffic in logs. Analyst Mya Than has estimated that 50,000 cubic tons of Myanmar timber were smuggled into Thailand every year in the mid-1980s.[34] Ethnic insurgencies (like the Karen and Wa state armies), drug lords, the Myanmar military, and corrupt Thai customs and police all had a hand in this traffic. Today, the commerce continues, but in less brazen, more circuitous pathways. It has come to light, for example, that timber is illicitly cut in large batches in the Salween National Park, transported across the border to Myanmar, and then re-exported to Thailand, with the label "Exported from Myanmar" on the logs. Although over 10,000 trees were cut down in this manner in August 1997 alone, a source reports that only 300 were eventually confiscated by authorities on the border. Bertil Lintner's map on timber concession areas between the two countries makes clear why this is so: the border, from the northern terminus at Laos to the famed "Three Pagodas Pass", not far from Bangkok, has been a necklace of adjoining timber concessions for years, stretching literally for hundreds of miles.[35]
A last forest frontier which is being consistently cut and then smuggled is the vast canopy of trees which sits astride the Malaysian-Indonesian border in Borneo. The terrain here is one of the most isolated and rugged on earth -- a fact that has stopped illegal merchants of these trees only to a limited degree. The problem is particularly acute on the Sabah boundary with Indonesia; the Sarawak border, although longer and less easily watched, is inaccessible for smuggling in certain areas, unless this takes place by helicopter. In an interview with a conservation programme director, who insisted on anonymity, a scenario was sketched out that is similar to the Thai-Myanmar frontier, in which Malaysian loggers cross the border with Indonesia, and then float their illicitly-cut logs downstream back to the Malaysian side.[36] Straight-out cross-border cutting is also being practised: the authorities in Sabah seized 2.3 million ringgit worth of logs in September 1997 alone, while at least five separate illegal operations were detected in the last half of that year, according to the Sabah Forest Industries Enforcement Unit.[37] The fruits of these investigations have strayed even farther off the border as Indonesian authorities have made similar confiscations as far from the frontier as coastal Samarinda and even Timor.[38] The picture that emerges from all of these seizures is that one of the world's oldest primary rainforests is rapidly disappearing. Timber has become one more commodity to be fed into the international ring of contraband biota, creating subterranean wealth, instability, and the potential for conflict on Southeast Asia's frontiers.
A second class of commodities that are smuggled across borders in Southeast Asia is what might be broadly defined as "consumer goods". This category is representative of a broad spectrum of goods that are illegally transited: cigarettes, automobiles, compact discs, pornography, antique sculptures, and religious items. In terms of the sheer number of cases, this sub-branch of contrabanding is probably the most important in Southeast Asia. In the first nine months of 1997, for example, Vietnam logged over 12,000 smuggling cases of goods (worth over 400 billion Vietnamese dong [US$33 million], a number that is almost certainly a fraction of the actual figures.)[39] Government representatives of the ASEAN states acknowledge the disparity. "We can't catch the real smugglers," said one government official to the Far Eastern Economic Review, citing the traffickers' mobile phones and faster boats, which often render them far better equipped than border guards.[40] Yet regional administrations have tried to combat contraband syndicates, using measures as diverse as stiff fines and newly-computerized customs services. The results have been disappointing, from the state's viewpoint. Smuggling of consumer goods is still booming in Southeast Asia, and the situation is getting worse.
It is difficult to pinpoint with any accuracy those nations which are more involved in these movements than others. The passage of contraband is so widespread in Southeast Asia, especially in the case of consumer goods, that it is not possible to single out certain borders or spheres as being more problematic than others. Nevertheless, a glimpse at a few of these spaces can provide an idea of how systemic this trafficking has really become, and what is being routed. Mya Than has published two tables outlining what passed back and forth illegally across Myanmar's frontiers in the mid-1980s: the items included chemicals, machinery, and medicines on the import side, as well as gems, livestock, and heroin exported to Thailand.[41] The Sino-Vietnamese border is another transit area with a high volume of contraband; here, garments, electric fans, and bicycles are "hot" items, mostly because Hanoi restricts these goods in an effort to protect domestic production. Maritime spaces should also be mentioned in the Southeast Asian context, as there is no shortage of consumer-goods smuggling in this realm, either. From interviews conducted with Indonesian sailors on Jakarta's docks, the impression gained was that the passage of goods outside local waters to the country's neighbours could easily be arranged (bisa diatur). Meanwhile, Indonesian workers interviewed in Singapore said that almost anything could be ordered from nearby Riau, if one knew how.[42] In the Philippines, the situation is much the same; long coastlines and corrupt maritime patrols make for easy on- and off-loading, the opportunities stretching literally for thousands of miles.[43]
It is, perhaps, more enlightening to focus on sub-categories of consumer goods, rather than nations, in exploring the movement of contraband commodities. Cigarettes are one frequently-trafficked good that illustrate patterns of interest: small yet relatively expensive, they are a fairly common luxury item which nevertheless enjoys a near omnipresent demand in Southeast Asia. Singapore seems to operate as a clearing house for smuggled cigarettes: Malaysians and Indonesians are constantly caught bringing in consignments of cartons to the island, sometimes selling them below street-value, at other times trafficking in Indonesian kretek (clove cigarettes), a slightly more expensive item.[44] Smuggling syndicates in Singapore also send contraband cigarettes to Cambodia and Vietnam, where they are moved across borders in very large quantities.[45] Finally, in the Philippines the navy is continually pursuing cigarette smugglers, who appear in quick motorized launches off Mindanao and Sulu in the south. Intercept operations have netted millions of pesos worth of cartons in the above-mentioned ports, and also in warehouses in Manila.[46]
The newest and perhaps most economically-damaging case of smuggled consumer goods in the region has been the explosive rise of compact disc (CD) and video compact disc (VCD) trafficking. Estimates vary over how much contrabanding there really is of these products in Southeast Asia, but almost all of the prognostications put the percentages extremely high. The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry says that at least 30 per cent of music CDs are pirated in Singapore, while the Association of Recording Video Importers puts the rates on VCD pirating in Indonesia at as high as 99 per cent. These numbers can be superceded, however: Jack Valenti, President of the U.S. Motion Picture Association, says that fully 100 per cent of all American films available on video in Vietnam are pirated versions.[47] While the physical disc may be produced locally (but illegally) in some of these situations, what is being smuggled apart from the disc is the intellectual property of the performance. No Southeast Asian country seems immune from this high-tech contrabanding, from war-torn Cambodia to relatively isolated Brunei.[48] Industry executives have taken to offering rewards for information on traffickers. When one thinks of how much music is actually consumed in the region by Southeast Asia's younger generations, one gets a sense of how pervasive and financially damaging this trade can be to area states.
An important subset of the smuggling of video discs consists of the contraband trade in pornography. Conservative social norms in most Southeast Asian countries mitigate against the open sale of pornography as a kind of "cultural contagion" from the West. This has not stopped pornography from becoming one of the most eagerly-trafficked items in the region within the "consumer goods" rubric. The numbers and vast diffusion of all these items is unsurprising: with more disposable income available after decades of high growth, pornography has quickly found a willing market in Southeast Asia. The presence of such materials can also be a destabilizing influence, however, as its presence is touted by religious and other advocacy groups as proof of the declining moral fibre of the population of several Southeast Asian states.
Contraband computer software, also trafficked on a large scale, is doing a brisk business as well. Computer-ownership rates are still quite low in Southeast Asia, but this has not stopped the eager purchase of smuggled computer software on a very large scale. A study by the International Planning and Research Corporation found that 97 per cent of software in Indonesia was pirated, costing the industry US$197.3 million in lost revenues in 1997. This ratio means that Indonesia has the world's second-highest rate of software piracy, after Vietnam. Consumers in Indonesia do not seem to mind that the product they are buying may be inferior or flawed compared to the original; official support services for software are, in any case, still primitive, and thus, many people are willing to take their chances.[49] In Thailand, the Business Software Alliance (BSA) has indicated that it hopes to reduce the rate of piracy significantly, while in Malaysia the same organization has been instrumental in the government's handing out of stiff fines to software pirates.[50] Smuggling of software has continued on a vast scale, however, particularly in China: the BSA estimates that the industry is losing almost US$19 billion a year, just between China and its "special autonomous region", Hong Kong. Much of the software are smuggled down to Southeast Asia. This clandestine trade has also acted as a potential flashpoint in U.S.-ASEAN trade negotiations, as Washington tries to stem the flow of computer programmes which are sold without regard to intellectual property rights.[51]
Furthermore, in the information age, perhaps no consumer good is more desired than those slips of paper which allow people (or their money) to travel freely -- in other words, "documentation", in the widest sense of the term. Southeast Asia has become a fertile field for people who traffic in counterfeit documents: visas, passports, employment passes, and credit cards, for example. This has happened in Indonesia, where counterfeit maritime documents have been discovered, allowing "seamen" to enter and exit the country at will; it has also happened in Vietnam, as well as in Singapore.[52] In Cambodia, an air force general was arrested in early 2001 for issuing false military identity cards, while other Cambodians have run complicated operations to get people to the United States. Finally, a visa and forged identity-card making operation was also discovered recently in Malaysia; Kuala Lumpur authorities impounded computers, laser-printers, and sophisticated scanners, all used to smuggle people into that country.[53] The security dimension underlying all these operations has spurred regional police forces to quick action. When identity itself becomes a commodity, freely bought and sold in Southeast Asia's hidden markets, it is not difficult to understand why the transit of these "consumer goods" poses serious problems to the functioning of area states.
Border permeability in Southeast Asia has increased dramatically in the past few decades, in fact to unprecedented levels. The boundary agreements concluded by the ASEAN states have facilitated regional transport links, building new ones where fresh conduits were needed, and re-enforcing older ones where trade had swamped existing resources. These links have greatly increased the "legal", above-board dimensions of trade in Southeast Asia, but they have also opened the doors to a tidal wave of contraband, which now greatly concerns regional governments. Organized crime syndicates have been quick to exploit these openings, trafficking an enormous range of goods between regional states in an attempt to garner quick profits. Official corruption has also facilitated these crossings as border guards, police forces, and dishonest politicians have used these flows for their own purposes. Indeed, border porosity in ASEAN is one place to look for the establishment and maintenance of alternate power sources outside of the state in this region. This holds true for actors comfortably trying to preserve the "fluid economics" of the status quo, as well as for actors who want to take a new (and greater) slice of the area's riches. Both groups see the wide bandwidth of "illicit" commodities that move through regional and transregional circuits as avenues to expanded influence.[54]
Though drugs, humans, and guns usually attract the most attention in these crossings, a strong argument can be made that it is the totality of illegal goods in motion which pose the greatest threat to area security. The illicit commerce in timber destabilizes area borders; this has been the case on Thailand's frontiers with Myanmar and Cambodia, as well as on the Malaysian-Indonesian boundary in Borneo. All five of these states have skirmished over logging access [and the riches provided therein) in the last several decades. The traffic in wildlife has also been a part of the regional security equation, as poachers continue to cross borders in search of ever-shrinking populations of valuable regional fauna. Consumer goods, such as CDs, computer software, and even contraband cigarettes, have also affected ASEAN members' political relationships with each other, and with the West.[55] The swirling flow of illegal commodities in Southeast Asia has increased the potential for conflict, as states and non-state actors have vied for the revenues, turf, and moralities connected with these trades. These conflicts have been episodic, but they are a real part of Southeast Asia's contemporary security mosaic. All indications point to the likelihood that this will continue to be the case for the foreseeable future.
1. See, for example, Khoo How San, "ASEAN as a `Neighborhood Watch Group'", Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 2 [2000]: 279-301; and Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security, [Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996).
2. See the essays in Peter Katzanstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics [New York: Columbia University Press, 1996].
3. Two sophisticated statements here are Hastings Donnan and Thomas Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation, and State (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1999), pp. 1-14; and Malcolm Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World [Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
4. For comparative analyses of frontiers, see A.I. Asiwaju, Borderlands Research: A Comparative Perspective (El Paso: University of Texas Borderlands Perspective Paper
6, 1983); and Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel, "Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands", Journal of World History 8, no. 2 (1997). For useful anthropological studies, see Deborah Pellow, Setting Boundaries: The Anthropology of Spatial and Social Organization (Westport, CT: Berlin and Garvey, 1996); and Hastings Donnan and Thomas Wilson, "An Anthropology of Frontiers", in Border Approaches: Anthropological Perspectives on Frontiers, edited by H. Donnan and T.M. Wilson (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1994).
5. Two very good recent studies here are Josiah McC. Heyman, ed., States and Illegal Practices [Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1999]; and Wilem van Schandel, "Easy Come, Easy Go: Smugglers on the Ganges", Journal of Contemporary Asia 23, no. 2 (1993): 189-213.
6. See Thonschai Winichakul's discussion on this; Thailand was a partial exception to this pattern in Southeast Asia. Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994). For a theoretical discussion on the nature (and evolution) of borders, see J.R.V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987).
7. "Bargains Di Langit Terbuka BIMP-EAGA", Suara Pembaruan, 25 November 1997, p. 16; and "Mindanao Bakal Unggul Di Timur ASEAN", Suara Pembaruan, 25 January 1997, p. 17.
8. "A New World of Possibilities for Lao Aviation Travelers", Vientiane Times, 3-5 April 2001, pp. 1-2; "Lao-Myanmar Border Co-Operation Discussed", Vientiane Times, 24 September 1997, p. 1; "Border Market --Big Problem for Vietnam", Vietnam Economic News 40, no. 1 [October 1993): 4-5; Teh-chang Lin, "The Development of Mainland China's Border Trade", Issues and Studies: A Journal of Chinese Studies and International Affairs (July 1996], pp. 42-53; "Border Openings Should Increase Thai Trade", Weekly Review of the Cambodia Daily, 7 February 1997, p. 13. For a very good, recent analysis of mainland Southeast Asian border patterns as a whole, see Grant Evans, Chris Hutton, and Kuah Khun Eng, eds., Where China Meets Southeast Asia: Social and Cultural Change in the Border Region (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2000).
9. "Pos Pelintas Bates RI-Filipina Ditambah", Kompas, 10 December 1997, p. 8; "Tenaga Willing to Supply Power to Sumatra via Bridge Link", Straits Times, 29 June 1997; "Malaysia Undecided Where Bridge to Indonesia Will Begin", Straits Times, 26 June 1997. For boundary agreements across the land border in Borneo, see Laporan Delegasi Republik Indonesia Mengenai Pertemuan Panitia Teknis Bersama Perbatasan Indonesia-Malaysia Yang Ke-12 Tentang Survey dan Penegasan Bersama Perbatasan Darat Antara Indonesia and Malaysia (Jakarta: Taud ABRI, 1981).
10. "Cambodia-Malaysian Trade Up 83.5 Percent", Weekly Review of Cambodia Daily, 19-23 March 2001, p. 4; "Oudomsay to Get Land Route to China", Vientiane Times, 10-12 April 2001, p. 4; "Immigration Plaza to be Built at Border Town", Straits Times, 9 July 1997; and "Land-Linked, not Land-Locked", Vientiane Times, 17-19 September 1997, p. 9.
11. "Burma Road", Far Eastern Economic Review [FEER], 6 November 1997, pp. 16-17. This is to say nothing of the other descending "pincer" of Chinese influence into Southeast Asia, Beijing's claims on the Spratley and Paracel Islands. See "Laut Cina Selatan, Tambang Emas Masa Depan", Kompas, 4 December 1997, p. 7.
12. These concerns have been on the agenda of recent APEC meetings; see "Spotlight on Free Trade, Security as APEC Opens," Viet Nam News, 16 November 2000, p. 1-9. For the incident itself, see "Thai Mekong Patrol Officers Threaten Leo Cargo Boat Crews", Vientiane Times, 15-17 October 1997, pp. 1-2.
13. "TNI AL Usir 10,096 Kapal", Kompas, 5 December 1997, p. 8; "Efektivitas Gelar Unsur Laut Perlu Pemikiran Konsepsional Lebih Lanjut", Angkatan Bersenjata, 27 November 1997, p. 12; and "Perahu Dari Manado Hanyut 3,000 Km", Suara Pembaruan, 25 November 1997, p. 1.
14. "Other ASEAN States Urged to Follow Singapore-KL Joint Approach to Crime", Straits Times, 10 June 1997; "Vietnam, Cambodia Police Sign Police Accord", Weekly Review of the Cambodia Daily, 19 March 1997, p. 8; and "Lao Police Delegation Back From Interpol Meeting in Beijing", Vientiane Times, 20-23 September 1997, p. 4.
15. Indonesia has taken to mapping the culture of border peoples in this manner, too; see Suwarsono, Daerah Perbatasan Kalimantan Barat: Suatu Observasi Terhadap Karekteristik Sosial Budaya Dua Daurab Lintas Batas (Jakarta: Pusat Penilitian dan Pengembangan Kemasyarakatan dan Kebudayaan, 19970. "Eye on Ships", Straits Times, 7 June 1997; "Seminar on New Lao Mapping and Survey Network Held in Vientiane", Vientiane Times, 5-7 November 1997, p. 4; and "Border Market to be Opened", Jakarta Post, 10 November 1997, p. 2. For the other example mentioned above, see "AFP Waging High-Tech War vs. Abus", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 9 April 2001, p. 2.
16. "Government to Remove Immigration Chief", Jakarta Post, 3 April 2001, p. 2; "Jemaah Haji Paspor Hijau Tetap Dilarang", Angkatan Bersenjata, 19 November 1997, p. 7; "K.L. to Launch Passport with Electronic Security Devices", Straits Times, 27 July 1997; and "New Regulations on Border Passes to Thailand", Vientiane Times, 29-31 October 1997, p. 20.
17. Two recent books, one on the Philippines, the other on Thailand, have explored these dimensions in quite sophisticated fashion; see, respectively, John Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999]; and Pasuk Phongpaichit, Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja: Thailand's Illegal Economy and Public Policy (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1998).
18. "Korupsi, Dampak, dan Solusinya", Angkatan Bersenjata, 11 November 1997, p. 4; and "Vietnam dan Indonesia Terkorup di Asia", Kompas, 19 March 2001, p. 3.
19. "Sugar Daddy", Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 November 1997, pp. 27-30; "Smells in High Places", The Economist, 28 May 1994, pp. 32-33; "Guingona Says Sotto Bought Shabu Chemical", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 27 November 1997, p. 1; and "Policeman Was Found With Obscene Videotapes", Straits Times, 7 June 1997.
20. "Subsidized Smuggling," Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 March 2001, p. 18; "HK Official Says Cambodia a Criminal Haven", Weekly Review of the Cambodia Daily, 24 January 1997, p. 14; "Safe Haven for the Mafia", Cambodia Times, 25 August 1997, p. 1; "Crime to Rise in the Asia Pacific", Vietnam News, 1 November 1997, p. 7; and "Organized Crime Threatens Asia-Pacific Stability", Borneo Bulletin, 1 November 1997.
21. "Canadians Bagged Holding Bad Bills", Weekly Review of the Cambodia Daily, 6 February 1997, p. 11: "Fake US Dollar Bills Printed at Three Pyongyang Plants", Straits Times, 29 June 1997; and "Japan Busts Counterfeiting Ring", Straits Times, 19 June 1997.
22. "Seek UN Help to Fight Money Laundering, Interpol Urges", Straits Times, 21 October 1997; and "The Disappearing Taxpayer", The Economist, 31 May 1997. p. 13 passim.
23. "Polisi Buat Sketsa Wajah Tersangka Pemasang Bom", Kompas, 19 March 2001, p. 17; "Gun Find at Airport", Cambodia Times, 27 October 1997, p. 1; "Man Nabbed in Rifles Case", Cambodia Times, 10 November 1997, p. 3; "Polisi Sita 225 Karung Amonium Nitrat", Kompas, 2 December 1997, p. 8: and "Pelempar `Bom' Rumah Hakim Ditangkap", Suara Pembaruan, 18 November 1997, p. 18.
24. "Thai-Burmese Border Warms Up", Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 April 2001, p. 10; "Border Bravado", Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 March 2001, p. 19.
25. "Fighting on a New Front in a Forgotten War", Asiaweek, 19 January 2001, p. 32-35; and A Modern Form of Slavery: Trafficking of Burmese Women and Girls into Brothels in Thailand (New York: Asia Watch, 1993).
28. See, for example, Rizwan Gregory. "A Wanton Waste of Beauty: Asia's Wildlife Trade", Asian Geographic 7 (March-April 2001): 64-77; and "The Ten Billion Dollar Black Market in Endangered Animals", New York Times Magazine, 16 February 1997, p. 28.
27. "Populasi Harimau Sumatera Tarancam dan Mengancam", Angkatan Bersenjata, 25 November 1997, p. 5; "Toothless Environmental Laws Keep Wildlife Trade Healthy", Weekly Review of the Cambodia Daily, 10 March 1997, p. 3. For the important place of the tiger in Chinese culture and its indigenous pharmacopoeia, see Edward Schaefer's fascinating study, The Vermilion Bird: T'ang Images of the South (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 228-29. See also Eric Dinarstein, A Framework for Identifying High Priority Areas and Actions for the Conservation of Tigers in the Wild (Washington D.C: World Wildlife Fund/Wildlife Conservation Society, 1977), pp. 1-11.
28. "The Ten Billion Dollar Black Market in Endangered Animals", New York Times Magazine, 16 February 1997, p. 30. These items are prized by collectors, not epicures: this also holds true for many rare snakes. See "Hunted and Hounded: Rare Boelen's Python Slithers to Extinction," Jakarta Post, 13 April 2001, p. 9. On turtles, see "Foiled -- Plot to Smuggle Out Rare Turtles", Straits Times, 13 September 1997; photo with caption, Indonesian Observer, 9 September 1997, p. 4; and "Endangered Tortoises Seized From Mini-Mart, Straits Times, 5 June 1997. See also B.P. Joshi, Wild Animal Medicine (New Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing Co., 1991).
29. For the general context, see Jenne H. de Beer, The Economic Value of Non-Timber Forest Products in Southeast Asia (Amsterdam: Netherlands Committee for IUCN, 1989), pp. 1-175. See also "Foreign Botanists Stealing Plants From Endau Rompin", New Straits Times (Malaysia), 1 December 1997, p. 1; "Ramos Cracks Down on Herb Hunters", Straits Times, 2 December 1997; "Two Thais Killed on Border". Nation (Thailand), 26 November 1997, p. A6; Pinkaew Laungaramsri, "The Ambiguity of `Watershed': The Politics of People and Conservation in Northern Thailand", SOJOURN 15, no. 1 (2000): 52-75 (especially pp. 59-63); and "Eagle-Wood Trees, Once Abundant, Now Driven to Extinction", Viet Nam News, 16 November 1997, p. 7.
30. "Putusan Hakim Terhadap Nelayan Asing Terlalu Ringan", Suara Pembaruan, 2 April 2001, p. 14; "209 Unit Pukat Harimau Dimusnahkan", Angkatan Bersenjata, 8 November 1997, p. 8; "Navy Catches Filipino Boats", Jakarta Post, 29 November 1997, p. 2; and "Chinese Fishermen on Trial", Jakarta Post, 5 September 1997, p. 2.
31. For illegal mining and extraction, see "DENR Cracks Down on Illegal Mining", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 25 November 1997, p. 15; and also "Pailin Residents, Thai Firms Cash In On Post KR-Gem Rush", Weekly Review of the Cambodia Daily, 19 March 1997, p. 9. For small-time timber-runners, see "5 Taiwanese Held For Logs", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 1 November 1997, p. 16; and "Smugglers Leave Central Pine Forests Bleeding", Viet Nam News, 23 November 1997, p. 9. During a fieldwork trip to the Thai/Burmese border near Mae Sot in the early 1990s, I saw gems being traded in the back alleys of Mae Sot town, not just on the main strip of gem shops; some of the merchants who were engaged in this commerce also had attack rifles loaded in the backs of their jeeps. Gem smuggling is a huge business on this frontier, as it is also on the Thai border with Cambodia. On the Burmese boundary, the shallow draught of the Moei River (only 4 feet in some places) makes gem smuggling very easy. I was able to wade across the border into Burma about a mile north of the Mae Sot/Myawaddy checkpoint with no problems in 1990; a motorized patrol skiff, manned by Burmese border guards, came down the river only infrequently. Burmese traders I spoke with said that the dangers of this commerce were very real -- someone had been shot trying to transport contraband goods only the week before I had gotten there. For a discussion of the area, see Mya Than's Myanmar's External Trade, ISEAS Current Economic Affairs Series (Singapore: ISEAS, 1992), p. 59; and also his "The Golden Quadrangle of Mainland Southeast Asia: A Myanmar Perspective", ISEAS Economics and Finance Working Paper 5 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1996), p. 13. For the size and scope of the illegal timber trade generally in Southeast Asia, see Herb Thompson, The Political Economy of Forestry, Logging, and Timber Industries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Region (Murdoch: Murdoch University Asia Research Centre on Social, Political, and Economic Change, 1995), pp. 1-31.
32. "RCAF to Focus on Loggers Again", Cambodia Times, 18 August 1997, p. 3; "Logs Seized in Mekong River Raid", Weekly Review of the Cambodia Daily, 14 April 1997, p. 3; "Resin Farmers Protest Tree-Felling", Phnom Penh Post, 16-29 March 2001, p. 12.
33. "Thais, Cambodians Meet to Discuss Logging", Weekly Review of the Cambodia Daily, 13 January 1997, p. 2; "Police Blame Thai Business for Koh Kong Logging Rise", Weekly Review of the Cambodia Daily, 23 April 1997, p. 7; and "Timber Trucks Load Up in Ratanakkiri", Weekly Review of the Cambodia Daily, 10 January 1997, p. 13.
34. Mya Than, Myanmar's External Trade, p. 58.
35. "Amid State of Decay, Crime Pays", Nation (Thailand), 15 November 1997, p. A4; "RF to Seek Closure of Border Checkpoints", Nation (Thailand), 12 November 1997, p. A3; and Bertil Lintner, Cross Border Drug Trade in the Golden Triangle (Durham, UK: International Boundaries Research Unit, 1991), p. 29.
36. According to this source also, a parallel contraband, crossing the Borneo land border but moving in the opposite direction (that is, Malaysia to Indonesia), is the commerce in bullets and firearms, which are much cheaper and easier to procure in Sarawak and Sabah than they are in Indonesian Borneo. For two rather opposite appraisals of timber trading in this region, see Globalisation of the Timber Industry in the Next Millennium: Conference Proceedings (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Timber Industry Board and Malaysian Timber Council, 1998), pp. 1-118; and Nancy Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
37. For the larger picture, see "Concern over Deforestation in Indonesia and Malaysia", Nation, 30 January 2001, p. 6. See also "Another Illegal Logging Op. Detected in Sabah", New Straits Times, 27 November 1997, p. 6; and "Logs Worth $1.2m Seized in Illegal Logging Raid in Sabah", Straits Times, 11 September 1997.
38. "Ribuan Jati Muda di Kupang Ditebang", Kompas, 19 March 2001, p. 19; "Ribuan Meter Kubik Kayu Illegal Disita di Samarinda", Suara Pembaruan, 23 November 1997, p. 6; "Timber Thieves Caught in the Act", Jakarta Post, 20 November 1997, p. 2.
39. For the political context of doi mai for these numbers, see Quan Xuan Dinh, "The Political Economy of Vietnam's Transformation Process", Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 2 (2000): 360-88. See also "Customs Well Short of Plan", Viet Nam News, 19 November 1997, p. 2.
40. "Struggle or Smuggle", Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 February 1997, p. 26 passim.
41. Mya Than, Myanmar's External Trade, p. 57-58. The structural conditions of how this situation has remained so fluid on Burma's borders is explained well in Stephen McCarthy, "Ten Years of Chaos in Burma: Foreign Investment and Economic Liberalization Under the SLORC-SPDC 1988-1998", Pacific Affairs 73, no. 2 (2000): 233-63, especially p. 257.
42. These interviews were conducted with Bugis sailors on Jakarta's Sunda Kalapa docks in August and September of 1998; I cannot give the names of the crew members (or their ships) for obvious reasons. These sailors, in fact, spoke of the true "outlaws" in Indonesian waters as being the maritime police -- agents who can shake down passing ships with near impunity. Interviews were also conducted with Indonesian labourers (in a variety of occupations) in Singapore.
43. "Believe it or Not", Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 October 1997, p. 23.
44. "Cigarette Haul", Straits Times, 19 July 1997; "Cigarettes Smuggled in Car Compartment", Straits Times, 5 July 1997, and "$6.3m Fine for Cigarette Smuggler", Straits Times, 23 June 1997.
45. "Struggle or Smuggle", Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 February 1997, p. 27.
46. "Smuggled Champion Cigarettes Confiscated", Manila Bulletin, 10 November 1997, p. 20; "Blue-Seal Cigarettes Seized", Manila Bulletin, 1 November 1997, p. 12. See also John Sidel, "Murder, Inc., Cavite: Capitalist Development and Political Gangsterism in a Philippine Province", in Gangsters, Democracy, and the State in Southeast Asia, edited by Carl Trocki (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1998), pp. 55-80.
47. "The Fine Line on Pirated Goods", Jakarta Post, 31 Angust 1997, p. 1; "Report Music Pirates and Get Paid", Straits Times, 16 October 1997, p. 38. See also "Importer Rasmi LD/Video Statis Perlu Ditinjau Izinnya", Angkatan Bersenjata, 27 November 1997, p. 9; and "VN Bootleggers Targeted", Nation (Thailand), 6 December 1997, p. A6.
48. "Vendor: Licensing CD's, VCD's, Unworkable", Weekly Review of Cambodian Daily, 19-23 March 2001, p. 2; and "War Against CD Piracy", Borneo Bulletin, 1 November 1997, p. 1.
49. "The Fine Line on Pirated Goods", Jakarta Post, 31 August 1997, p. 1; and "Pirated Software: Your Gain and Loss", Jakarta Post, 31 August 1997, p. 9.
50. For a cogent analysis of how illegality survives and indeed flourishes in the Thai business context, see James Ockey, "Crime, Society, and Politics in Thailand", in Gangsters, Democracy, and the State in Southeast Asia, edited by Carl Trocki (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1998), pp. 39-54. For the ramifications on the computer industries of these two countries, see "BSA to Target Provinces", Nation (Thailand), 9 December 1997, p. F2; and "Malaysia Tougher on Piracy", Nation (Thailand), 9 December 1997, p. F2.
51. "Hong Kong Haven for Pirated Software", Borneo Bulletin, 21 November 1997, p. 16; and "Swift Action Needed to Deal with Software Pirates", Straits Times, 24 July 1997.
52. "Five Nabbed for Falsifying Shipping Documents for Crew", Jakarta Post, 3 November 1997, p. 3.
53. "RCAF General Charged with Issuing Fake ID's", Weekly Review of Cambodia Daily, 2-6 April 2001, p. 6; "Americans Alarmed by Visa Scam Artists", Phnom Penh Post, 16 February to 1 March 2001, p. 3; and "Couple Arrested for Forging IC's and Visit Passes", Straits Times, 7 November 1997.
54. See, for example, the essays in Carl Trocki, ed., Gangsters, Democracy, and the State in Southeast Asia.
55. Unfortunately, these non-military aspects of regional security have often been left out of otherwise very keen analyses of the region. See, for example, N. Ganesan, "ASEAN's Relations with Major External Powers", Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 2 (2000): 258-78; and Sheldon Simon, "International Relations Theory and Southeast Asian Security", Pacific Review 8, no. 1 (1995): 5-24, both of which concentrate on more "traditional" security concerns (the role of the United States, China, and Japan, as well as arms build-ups, Cambodia's instability, and territorial claims in the South China Sea.) The problems posed by border permeability and contraband never figure in these very cogent examinations.
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